SELLINGS, Joseph;
JANS, Jan
The Splendor
of Accuracy: An examination of the Assertions Made by Veritatis Splendor.
Kok Pharos Publishing House, Eerdmans 1994, 181
pp.
This volume contains an introduction by the
editors, six contributed essays, and an index of persons, documents and
scriptural references in Veritatis Splendor.
In their introduction Sellings and Jans write
that the "central question that needs to be posed to the text of Veritatis
Splendor" concerns the audience and situation its author has in mind. They
maintain that it appears to be addressed to "universal pastors (priests
trained in seminaries) who (should) have one set of universal solutions to
every conceivable pastoral problem one might face, anywhere, anytime." Assuming
that this is indeed the case, they then claim that the "best way to
interpret what Veritatis Splendor says" is "from the point of
view of the pastors and their educators" and that the Encyclical finds
serious problems here (p. 9). They say that neither they nor the contributors
to the volume "wish or intend that this study be understood as a challenge
or a rebuke to the teaching of the magisterium in the encyclical." Rather,
they wish to "respond to the assertions made in the encyclical that give
the impression of pointing to serious problem areas in contemporary Roman
Catholic moral theology as it is being researched and taught in any number of
seminaries, universities and institutions of higher learning" (p. 10).
I believe that Sellings and Jans seriously
misconstrue the purpose of Veritatis Splendor. It is surely not intended
to equip priests trained in seminaries with "one set of universal
solutions to every conceivable pastoral problem one might face, anywhere,
anytime." Rather its stated purpose is to clearly set forth "certain
aspects of doctrine which are of a crucial importance in facing what is
certainly a genuine crisis" (n. 4) and to address this crisis by
presenting "the principles of a moral teaching based upon Sacred Scripture
and the living apostolic Tradition, and at the same time to shed light on the
presuppositions and consequences of the dissent which that teaching has
met" (n. 5). In particular, the "central theme" of the
Encyclical, as identified by John Paul II himself, is to reaffirm the Church's
teaching that there are "intrinsically evil acts" prohibited
"always and without exception" by universally valid and immutable
moral prohibitions (n. 115).
John Paul II likewise emphasizes that the
"morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the
'object' rationally chosen by the deliberate will" (n. 78) and that
"reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their
nature
'incapable of being ordered' to God
because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his
image" (n. 80). Human acts specified by objects of this kind are the
intrinsically evil acts prohibited by absolute moral norms, the teaching which
constitutes, as has been noted, the "central theme" of the
Encyclical. Thus the Pope repudiates, as incompatible with Catholic teaching,
those moral theories which deny that one can judge an act immoral because of
the kind of "object" freely chosen and consequently deny that there
are intrinsically evil acts of this sort and, corresponding to them, absolute
moral norms (cf. nn. 74-77, 79). John Paul II, while repudiating these
theories, leaves unnamed contemporary Catholic theologians who espouse them.
Some contemporary moral theologians, commonly
associated with the proportionalist method of making moral judgments--a theory
rejected by John Paul II in the Encyclical--are among the contributors to this
volume, namely, Sellings himself, Louis Janssens, and Bernard Hoose, and in
their contributions Sellings and Hoose name other theologians known for their
advocacy of this moral theory, e.g., Joseph Fuchs and Richard A. McCormick. The
purpose of the essays found in this volume by Sellings, Janssens, and Hoose
seeks to be, as shall be seen, to show that John Paul II, in his
"assertions," has in reality seriously misunderstood what is going on
in contemporary moral theology. Thus this review of "The Splendor of
Accuracy" will focus on the contributions by Sellings, Janssens, and
Hoose, centering on their examination of the "assertions" in Veritatis
Splendor that there are certain sorts of human acts, specified by the
object freely chosen, that are intrinsically evil and that, corresponding to
these intrinsically evil acts, there are absolute moral norms.
Before considering them, however, some brief
comments should be made about the other essays found in the volume. Of these,
the one by Brian Johnstone is quite different in tone from the others; those by
Gareth Moore and Jan Jans, however, seem intended to call features of the
Encyclical into question and, in the case of Jan Jans' contribution, indirectly
to support the positions of the theologians associated with the views espoused
by Sellings, Janssens, and Hoose.
Gareth Moore's essay is called "Some
Remarks on the Use of Scripture in Veritatis Splendor" (pp. 71-98).
Moore argues that John Paul II's use of the story of the rich young man (in
Matthew 19:16-21) "appears motivated by a desire not simply to listen to
what Jesus says, but to stress one particular mode of biblical discourse among
several, namely, the legal" (p. 81). He tries to show that this approach
"distorts the natural sense of the passage" (p. 81), whose
"central meaning," according to Moore, is to show that the encounter
between Jesus and the rich young man "provides an example of the power of
riches over those who own them and an occasion for the teaching of Jesus on how
hard it is for the rich to enter the kingdom of heaven (19:23ff)," a
central meaning that "the encyclical all but ignores" (p. 74).
Moore's critique here on the alleged
"legalistic" use of this passage by John Paul II. I believe this is a
serious distortion of the use to which John Paul II puts the passage. The Pope
repeatedly emphasizes, in his reflection on this passage from Matthew's Gospel,
the religious and existential significance of the question addressed to Jesus
by the rich young man when he asked, "Teacher, what good must I do to have
eternal life?" (Matt 19:16). The Pope explicitly says, "For the young
man the question is not so much about the rules to be followed, but about
the meaning of life....This question is ultimately an appeal to the
absolute Good which attracts and beckons us; it is the echo of a call from God
who is the origin and goal of man's life" (n. 7). It is, he continues,
"an essential and unavoidable question for the life of every man, for it
is about the moral good which must be done and about eternal life" (n. 8).
He emphasizes that the question is in reality "a religious question....the
goodness that attracts and at the same time obliges man has its source in God
and indeed is God himself" (n. 9).
It is surely true that, in reflecting on this
passage, John Paul II stresses the importance of keeping the commandments. Nonetheless,
he is at pains to show that the commandments in question, in particular, the
precepts of the Decalogue concerning our neighbor, are not legalistic
inhibitions arbitrarily imposed on us. Rather, they "are really only so
many reflections on the one commandment about the good of the person, at the
level of the many different goods which characterize his identity as a
spiritual and bodily being in relationship with God, with his neighbor, and
with the material world....The commandments of which Jesus reminds the young
man are meant to safeguard the good of the person, the image of God, by
protecting his goods" (n. 13). More could be added regarding this
point, but this should sufficiently show that it is not accurate to claim that
the Encyclical is using Scripture in a legalistic sense.
Moore also faults John Paul II's use of
Scripture in chapter two of the Encyclical. John Paul II appeals to various
biblical passages, in particular, the writings of St. Paul (e.g., l Cor
6:9-lO), to support his teaching that some sorts of human acts are
intrinsically evil. Moore maintains that in doing so the Pope is really reading
his own teaching into the text of Scripture. For instance, in the First
Corinthians text to which the Pope appeals St. Paul is not, so Moore argues,
talking about acts at all but about persons, i.e., adulterers, sexual perverts,
etc.
Regarding this criticism, I believe it
worthwhile to note the position developed by a reputable biblical scholar,
Silverio Zedda, in his monumental study of almost 400 pages, Relativo e
Assoluto nella morale di San Paolo (Brescia: Paideia Editrice, 1984). Zedda
devotes Chapter 5 of his work to "categorical moral norms" proposed
by St. Paul with respect to the moral life of the body-person, in particular
with reference to questions of sexual ethics. He devotes considerable attention
to the teaching found in l Thes 4:1-8 and l Cor 6:12-20, giving special
attention to the meaning of the Greek term porneia in these texts. Through
an in-depth study of the term not only in Paul but in the Greek text of the
Septuagint and in other NT writings, he shows that this Greek term designates a
wide range of immoral sexual activities. He stresses that it definitively
included not only prostitution and incest but "simple fornication,"
i.e., sexual relations between two persons who are not married. His conclusion
is that for St. Paul porneia, which is, after all, what the persons
identified as pornoi choose to do [i.e., the persons called "sexual
perverts" in the English translation of 1 Cor 6:10 cited above], in all
its senses is utterly incompatible with Christian moral life and that the norm
proscribing it is absolute. It thus seems to me that, pace Moore, an
exegete as respected as Zedda would not find inappropriate John Paul II's use of
Scripture to support his claim that there are intrinsically evil acts and,
corresponding to them, absolute moral norms.
Brian Johnstone's "Erroneous Conscience in
Veritatis Splendor and the Theological Tradition" (pp. 114-135) is,
as noted already, quite different in tenor from the other contributions. Johnstone
in no way examines "assertions" in the Encyclical. Rather he simply
wishes to present the Encyclical's teaching on erroneous conscience and to
situate it in relation to a wider moral theological tradition. He points out
that in the Encyclical John Paul II had said that "the Church's
Magisterium does not intend to impose on the faithful any particular
theological system, still less a philosophical one" (n. 29, cited by
Johnstone on p. 114). He shows that the teaching of the Encyclical on erroneous
conscience strongly reflects the influence of the theology of St. Thomas
Aquinas (pp. 118-123).
Although the Encyclical does reject some
contemporary understandings of conscience, it does not repudiate all non-Thomistic
theological understandings of erroneous conscience and its binding character,
for example, the teaching found in the writings of St. Alphonsus di Liguori,
whose own understanding of this matter differs from that of St. Thomas and
whose position was adopted by many authors of approved manuals of theology in
the l9th and 20th centuries. The school of St. Alphonsus and other schools of
thought on erroneous conscience, while providing different accounts of the
erroneous conscience than does St. Thomas and, following Aquinas, John Paul II,
are not incompatible with magisterial teaching and raise important questions
that merit consideration (pp. 124-134).
Johnstone's essay is, in short, a very helpful
and instructive study and is not intended to call into question the substantive
claims of Veritatis Splendor.
Jan Jans' contribution, the final essay in the
volume, is entitled "Participation-Subordination: (The Image of) God in Veritatis
Splendor" (pp. 153-168). According to Jans, the relationship between
God and man (or the way in which man is the "image of God") is
presented in two quite different ways in the Encyclical. According to one
model, which he calls "participation," "God only proposes in the
commandments what is good for human persons and that the proper contribution of
the Magisterium is to make visible those truths which Christian conscience
already ought to know" (pp. 166-167). On this model, which could also be
called the participated theonomy model, God, through the natural law,
"calls man to participate in his own providence, since he desires to guide
the world--not only the world of nature but also the world of human
persons--through man himself, through man's reasonable and responsible
care" (Veritatis Splendor, n. 43, cited on p. 157).
But according to another model which he
believes he finds in the Encyclical and which he calls
"subordination," John Paul II, here following in the footsteps of Leo
XIII, stresses "the essential subordination of reason and human law to the
Wisdom of God and to his law" (Veritatis Splendor, n. 44, cited on
p. 157). On this model God has the authority to "impose duties, to confer
certain rights and to sanction certain behavior" (Veritatis Splendor,
n. 44, cited on p. 157). This "subordination" model is rooted in a
hierarchical view of reality which, Jans asserts, is "in the last
resort...based upon the antagonism 'not human persons, but God': God alone-not
the human person--has the power to decide what is good and evil, and since God
is the Author of the Law and the Commandments these are to be accepted and
submitted to" (p. 163).
Jans acknowledges that "one might argue
that such moral voluntarism must not in and of itself mean heteronony," a
view rejected by John Paul II himself in n. 41 of the Encyclical (p. 163). But
he believes that he can detect the tension between these two models in the
Encyclical, which clearly favors the "participation" model. According
to him the passages in the document reflecting the "subordination"
model are principally those critical of some "contemporary"
developments in moral theology. He holds that some of the theologians
"whose work is 'evaluated' by Veritatis Splendor" are actually
engaged in overcoming the "antagonism between God as ruling king and human
beings as obedient servants" (p. 168), and that overcoming this antagonism
"calls for a revision of some traditional understandings and
interpretations of God's creative presence in the realm of 'nature', as well as
a revaluation of the concrete norms following from this perspective"
(p.169). He suggests, in short, that in reaffirming some "traditional
understandings" John Paul II is, despite the general thrust of the
Encyclical toward the "participation" model, echoing the
"subordination" model.
Jans believes that the "hermeneutical
key" to understanding the Encyclical and the "tension" found in
it between the participation and subordination models is to be found in an
address given by the Pope to the participants of the second international
congress on moral theology, held in Rome to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Humanae
vitae in 1988. In that talk John Paul II affirmed that the teaching of Paul
VI is not invented by human beings but inscribed by God's creative hand into
the nature of the human person and confirmed in revelation. He likewise held
that those who repudiate the norm taught by Humanae vitae refuse the
obedience of their intelligence to God, preferring the light of their own
reason against the light of divine Wisdom. Jans holds that this address
reflects the "subordination" model and that its echoes are found in Veritatis
Splendor.
Jans' essay is of remarkable interest and
ingenuity. Nonetheless, his analysis/interpretation of the Encyclical is
seriously questionable. The Pope certainly affirms that God is the sovereign
arbiter of good and evil and that human persons are to obey this law. Jans
regards this as a kind of "moral voluntarism." But there is not a
scintilla of voluntarism in the Encyclical. In affirming that God's law is the
supreme norm of human life, John Paul II does no more than did the Fathers of
Vatican Council II in Dignitatis humanae, n. 3. In maintaining that we
are to obey this law, he does no more than the Fathers of Vatican II in Gaudium
et spes, n. 16, where they say that "in the depths of his conscience
man detects a law which he does not impose upon himself and which he must
obey." Even though he calls this a moral "voluntarism," Jans
admits that it does (not?) of necessity lead to the heteronomous morality which
the Encyclical repudiates.
The "tension" Jans discovers in the
Encyclical between the "participation" and "subordination"
models is, I suggest, his own invention. There is no inner tension or
contradiction between "participation" and "subordination." For
example, through God's grace we, his creatures, really become divinized,
sharing in his divine nature just as surely as his only begotten Son-made-man
truly shares in our human nature. We are in truth members of the divine family
by reason of our sharing, our participation, in God's divine nature. Yet within
this family we remain creatures, with created human natures, just as God's
only-begotten Son-made-man remains God, with his uncreated nature. And as
creatures, as children of God, we are in truth subordinate to him.
It is said that necessity is the "mother
of invention." Perhaps Jans, seeing a desperate need to blunt the
Encyclical's critique of some contemporary movements in moral theology, has
simply "invented" the tension he claims to exist in Veritatis
Splendor between the "participation " and
"subordination" models.
Now to the essays of Sellings, Janssens, and
Hoose, which directly confront the "central theme" of the Encyclical,
namely, the reaffirmation of "the universality and immutability of the
moral commandments, particularly those which prohibit always and without
exception intrinsically evil acts" (n. 115), i.e., specific kinds
of human behavior, specified by the object of moral choice, which "are by
their nature 'incapable of being ordered' to God because they radically contradict
the good of the person made in his image" (n. 80).
Sellings' essay, the longest in the volume, is
called "The Context and Arguments of Veritatis Splendor" (pp.
11-70). His article is wideranging, beginning with a somewhat long introduction
to the background, context, and immediate origin of the Encyclical (pp. 11-20).
He then subjects to scrutiny many "assertions" of the document
regarding freedom, conscience, fundamental option, and the moral meaning of
human acts and the criteria for their proper evaluation. Here I will center
attention on the long introduction he provides and on the material devoted to
the moral significance of human acts and the criteria for evaluating them
insofar as the discussion of this subject concerns the "central
theme" of the Encyclical, namely, the universality and immutability of
moral norms prohibiting always and without exception intrinsically evil acts.
In sketching the background and context to the
Encyclical Sellings flatly states that those who accepted the challenge of
Vatican II and "began the work of reconstructing moral theology on the
basis of scripture and tradition rather than natural and canon law ultimately
came to be known as 'revisionists'" (p. 12). In other words, according to
Sellings the only theologians who seriously sought to renew moral theology
according to the mind of Vatican Council II are the "revisionist"
theologians, unnamed in the Encyclical but identified by him as including
people like Louis Janssens, Joseph Fuchs, and Bernard Haering. According to
Sellings, consequently, only "revisionist" theologians have sought to
carry out the task assigned moral theologians by Vatican II. It seems to me
that Sellings is here manifesting some interesting bias inasmuch as the efforts
of such theologians as Servais Pinckaers, Dionigi Tettamanzi, Ramón García de
Haro, Benedict Ashley, and Germain Grisez to renew moral theology according to
the principles set forth at Vatican II are simply ignored. Apparently their
work, in Sellings' view, does not merit consideration. It is also surprising to
find that Vatican II, according to Sellings' account, thinks that moral
theology should disregard natural law as one of its sources inasmuch as the
actual documents of the Council frequently appeal to the "universally binding
principles of natural law" (cf. Gaudium et spes, nn. 74, 79-80),
refer to the "law" men discover in the depths of their conscience
(ibid., n. 16), and speak eloquently of mankind's intelligent participation
(=natural law) in the "highest norm of human life," namely God's
"divine law--eternal, objective, and universal, whereby he governs the
entire universe and the human community according to a plan conceived in wisdom
and in love" (Dignitatis humanae, n. 3). Nonetheless, Sellings'
observations here are indicative of his approach.
Likewise indicative of his approach is his
claim, in the introductory material, that "nearly everything that"
Pope Pius XII's Encyclical "Humani Generis stood for was reversed
by the close of the Second Vatican Council" (p. 19). Sellings here implies
that the notion of theology and its work set forth in that Encyclical was
repudiated by the Council Fathers. This is quite an amazing claim by Sellings
in view of the fact that a Council document explicitly concerned with the teaching
of theology, and in particular, of moral theology, makes the teaching of Pius
XII's Encyclical its own. In Optatam totius, the Council Fathers
emphasize that in order for the work of Catholic theology to be carried out
rightly, it must be done "in the light of faith and under the guidance of
the Church's Magisterium" (n. 16). Precisely at this point in their
reflections concerning the "renewal" of theology, the Council Fathers
saw fit to append a footnote referring to the teaching of Pius XII in Humani
Generis. Moreover, the passage in this Encyclical to which they explicitly
call attention contains the following "assertions" of Pope Pius XII:
"Nor must it be thought that what is contained in encyclical letters does
not of itself demand assent, on the pretext that the Popes do not exercise in
them the supreme power of their teaching authority. Rather, such teachings
belong to the ordinary magisterium, of which it is true to say: 'he who hears
you, hears me' (Lk 10:16); very often, too, what is expounded and inculcated in
encyclical letters already pertains to Catholic doctrine for other reasons. But
if the supreme pontiffs in their official documents purposely pass judgment on
a matter of debate until then, it is obvious to all that the matter, according
to the mind and will of the same pontiffs, cannot be considered any longer a
question open to discussion among theologians."
Since the Fathers of Vatican II saw fit
deliberately to refer precisely to this text of Humani Generis in
discussing the renewal of theology, it is difficult to sustain the thesis
apparently advanced here by Sellings that the Council repudiated the teaching
of Pius XII.
Sellings' strategy is evident and is the
following. In his view John Paul II's Veritatis Splendor is a document
analogous to Pius XII's Humani Generis. Just as the latter has now, so
Sellings avers, been rejected, so too, the inference goes, will John Paul II's
Encyclical be repudiated in the future.
Sellings also finds the concept of theology set
forth in Humani Generis, a concept he judges incompatible with the
renewed concept of theology advocated by Vatican Council II, in Paul VI's
Encyclical Humanae vitae, and his observations regarding that document
also help to reveal the perspective from which he assesses the
"assertions" of Veritatis Splendor. According to Sellings Paul
VI was compelled in that Encyclical to take "a position that somewhat
mildly (emphasis added) rejected the use of contraception as a morally
acceptable option for married couples" (p. 14). This is a rather
surprising statement, but considering its source it is understandable. Sellings,
after all, was awarded an S.T.D. from the University of Louvain for a study
whose major claim was that "Pope Paul never really intended to condemn
every form of artificial birth control for the mature, responsible, loving
married couple."[1]
It is most important, I believe, to note this
in order to appreciate the presuppositions underlying Sellings' interpretation
of the "background and context" of Veritatis Splendor. I will
now examine some of the principal features found in his exposition of the
"assertions" of Veritatis Splendor regarding human acts and
their moral assessment, in particular, the Pope's thesis that the morality of
human acts depends primarily on the "object" rationally chosen and
that some objects can be judged incompatible with love of God and neighbor and
are hence intrinsically evil.
Sellings finds "rather bizarre" the
concepts of freedom and the will found in the following "assertion"
of Veritatis Splendor: "Some authors do not take into sufficient
consideration the fact that the will is dependent upon the concrete choices
which it makes: these choices are a condition of its moral goodness and its
being ordered to the ultimate end of the person" (n. 75). Sellings
believes that this is a "relatively new idea that has developed in the
literature in order to substantiate the theory of the 'basic goods'"(p.
47). I will return later to Sellings' remarks on the "theory of the 'basic
goods,'" but here I want to comment on his claim that the position found
in the Encyclical presents a "bizarre" and "relatively new
idea."
Earlier in the Encyclical John Paul II had
stressed that we determine ourselves through our freely chosen deeds. He
emphasized that such "freely chosen deeds do not produce a change merely
in the state of affairs outside of man but, to the extent that they are
deliberate choices, they give moral definition to the very person who performs
them; determining his profound spiritual traits" (n. 71). They are
a "decision about oneself and a setting of one's own life for or against
the Good, for or against the Truth, and ultimately for or against God" (n.
65). The Pope, far from considering this a "bizarre" and
"relatively new idea" notes that the precise point he is making has
been "perceptively noted by Saint Gregory of Nyssa." The Pope then
cites a beautiful passage from Gregory's De Vita Moysis (II, 2-3, PG
44, 327-328): "All things subject to change and to becoming never remain
constant, but continually pass from one state to another, for better or
worse....Now, human life is always subject to change; it needs to be born
anew....But here birth does come about by a foreign intervention, as is the
case with bodily beings...; it is the result of free choice. Thus we are
in a certain way our own parents, creating ourselves as we will, by our
decisions" (cited by John Paul II in n. 71).
Moreover, St. Thomas is very clear in affirming
that if the object of one's choice--the end of the inner act of the voluntas
eligens as distinct from the end of the inner act of the voluntas
intendens--is an act evil of itself (de se malus), then the act is
bad and the will is bad. There is a very instructive text in which St. Thomas
seems clearly to advance the idea that the choices of the will are, as John
Paul II says, "a condition of the will's moral goodness." In it he
writes: "...the will can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it
is intending, as bearing on an ultimate end or insofar as it is choosing, as
bearing on a proximate object which is ordered to an ultimate end. If it is
considered in the first way, the evil of the will suffices to make the act bad,
since whatever is done for a bad end is bad. Yet the goodness of the intending
will is not sufficient to make the act good, for the act may be bad in itself,
an act which in no way can be done well. But if the will is considered
insofar as it is choosing, then it is universally true that an act is said to
be good from the goodness of the will and bad from its badness."[2]
It thus appears that the concept of free choice
and the will found in John Paul II's "assertions" are not as
"bizarre" and "relatively new" as Sellings asserts.
As noted, Sellings believes that the
"bizarre" and novel notion of the significance of free choices in
determining man's moral life has been developed to substantiate the theory of
the "basic goods." Sellings contends (p. 67) that the use of the term
"good" as a substantive in the Encyclical, i.e., to designate "goods"
of human persons that one ought not freely choose to damage, harm, or destroy,
signifies that the Encyclical has been profoundly influenced by the
"novel" doctrine of "basic goods" developed principally by
Germain Grisez and John Finnis (cf. p. 67, note 52). Sellings says that he and
other theologians are "comfortable" with using the word
"good" as an adjective, but that its use as a substantive is unusual.
This seems very strange to me. Prescinding from
any influence of Grisez and Finnis, who have sought to develop the thinking of
St. Thomas and who indeed refer to "basic goods" of the human person,
the use of "good" as a substantive identifying real goods perfective
of human persons is surely not novel and is indeed central to the thought of
St. Thomas. In fact, St.Thomas held that "God is offended by us only
because we act contrary to our own good,"[3] and in discussing the primary
precepts of the natural law he had said that, since the very foundational
practical proposition on which the whole natural law is founded is that
"good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided,"
"reason naturally apprehends as good, and thus to be pursued by action all
those realities for which man has a natural inclination."[4] He listed some of these goods
(substantives, not adjectives) (human life itself, knowledge of the truth,
especially truth about God, life in fellowship with others), but did not intend
to provide a taxative list, as indicated by the fact that he referred to
"other goods of this kind."
Thus Sellings' claim that the Encyclical's use
of the term "good" as a substantive, i.e., to identify real goods of
human persons (e.g., innocent human life, the marital communion and so forth) is
novel and unique to the "basic goods" theory is simply nonsense. It
is worth noting here, moreover, that in a "review" of Grisez's
"Living a Christian Life"--a review highly disparaging in
character--Sellings says "I have not read this book" and shows clearly
that he did not when he says that it consists of 10 chapters. It actually
consists of 11 chapters, but evidently Sellings, in reviewing the table of
contents (and not reading the book), failed to turn one of the pages.[5]
In his further "examination" of the
"assertions" of Veritatis Splendor Sellings claims that,
"as the encyclical holds, it is possible to determine the morality of
human acts purely on a consideration of the 'object' of those acts (the
physical activity performed)" (p. 49, note 38; emphasis added). Sellings
is here claiming that according to the Encyclical the moral object putting an
act into its moral species is the physical activity performed. However,
if we read the text of the Encyclical we find the following statement: "By
the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event
of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to
bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world" (n. 78,
emphasis added).
The foregoing suffices to indicate the
character of Sellings' contribution to this work. Sellings, dean of the faculty
of moral theology at the University of Leuven, ought to take seriously the
title he gave to this work and examine some of his own "assertions."
Louis Janssens, emeritus professor of moral
theology at the University of Leuven (Janssens directed Sellings' dissertation
in which, as we have seen, he advanced the thesis that in Humanae Vitae
Paul VI did not intend to rule out completely contraceptive practices by
"responsible, mature, loving couples"), contributes an essay entitled
"Teleology and Proportionality: Thoughts About the Encyclical Veritatis
Splendor" (pp. 99-113).
The Encyclical, as we have seen, teaches that
one can judge that an act is intrinsically evil if the moral
"object," i.e., the object rationally chosen and willed, is not
referable to God, and that it is not necessary to consider circumstances and the
end for whose sake the act is chosen in order to recognize that acts of this
kind can never rightly be chosen and done.
The thrust of Janssens' paper is to argue that
the Encyclical is mistaken here--and mistaken in its rejection of the theory
that one can judge an action morally wrong only if one takes into account not
only the object but also the circumstances in which it is done and the end for
whose sake it is chosen. Janssens' thesis is that an appeal to proportionality
is "unavoidable for evaluating human acts," and that this assessment
of proportionality is teleological in character, i.e., that it can be made only
by taking into account the end for whose sake the action is undertaken.
In developing this thesis Janssens first
appeals (pp. 100-102) to the "Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia"
(1976) for support. He emphasizes that this document sharply distinguished
between "disproportionate" and "proportionate" treatments
of dying persons. The latter are morally obligatory, whereas the former can be
rightly withheld or withdrawn. Moreover, the judgment that a particular
treatment is "disproportionate" or "proportionate" can only
be made by assessing and balancing the harms and benefits it promises. Q.E.D.
It is, however, pertinent to ask whether the
use of the terms "disproportionate" and "proportionate" in
this Vatican document requires acceptance of the moral methodology Janssens
advocates and which the Encyclical rejects, since the Encyclical holds that one
can judge an act intrinsically evil on the basis of its moral object, i.e., the
object rationally chosen, without considering circumstances and the end for
whose sake it is chosen.
If we examine the document to which Janssens
appeals for support, we find that this is not the case. For prior to
considering the reasons for judging some medical treatments disproportionate or
proportionate, the "Declaration" had affirmed that euthanasia or
mercy killing is intrinsically immoral, not because it is
"disproportionate" but simply because it is the intentional killing
of an innocent human being: "nothing and no one," the document
maintained, "can in any way permit the killing of an innocent human
being."[6]
The situation here, one of which Janssens takes
advantage, is that there is a legitimate use of
"proportionality"--when one can make some moral judgments in
the light of an existing moral norm, such as the Golden Rule or
justice--and an illegitimate use of "proportionality"--when one claims,
as does Janssens, that all moral judgments must be made proportionally. The
difference between these two uses of "proportionally" is operative in
the "Vatican Declaration" to which he appeals. First, one can judge
that it is always wrong intentionally to kill innocent human beings without
appealinq to proportionality. Second, one can judge that some medical treatments
are "disproportionate" by applying the moral norm of justice
and determining whether particular treatments impose excessive burdens on patients--and
are consequently not morally required--or not.
This distinction between an appeal to
proportionality as necessary to evaluate the morality of all human acts
(Janssens' claim) and making some judgments of proportionality in the
light of a moral norm is clearly made by the bishops of the United States in
their Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, "The Challenge of Peace: God's
Promise and Our Response" (1983). The bishops first, appealing to the norm
that military force must be used discriminately, had ruled out as absolutely
immoral intentionally attacking noncombatants, i.e., innocent human beings. An
intrinsically evil act of this kind is absolutely excluded by the principle of
discriminate use of force. But they went on to discuss the principle of "proportionality."
In explaining it they said: "When confronting choices among specific
military options, the question asked by proportionality is: once we take into
account not only the military advantages that will be achieved by using this
means but also all the harms reasonably expected to follow from using it, can
its use still be justified? We know, of course, that no end can justify means
evil in themselves, such as the executing of hostages or the targetting of
non-combatants [i.e., acts intrinsically evil by reason of the object
rationally chosen and willed; cf. Veritatis Splendor, n. 78]. Nonetheless,
even if the means adopted is not evil in itself, it is necessary to take into
account the probable harms that will result from using it and the justice of
accepting those harms" (n. 105). Here the bishops are clearly not
advocating the moral methodology championed by Janssens (and repudiated by the
Encyclical), namely, that "an appeal to proportionality is unavoidable for
evaluating the morality of human acts" (Janssens, p. 100). They hold, with
the entire Catholic tradition--and with Veritatis Splendor-- that one
can know that it is always wrong intentionally to kill innocent human beings
without appealing to proportionality. But they are maintaining that, in the
light of a moral norm of justice, one can determine whether or not unintended
harms, i.e., unchosen harms anticipated to result as an unintended effect
of one's freely chosen act, can be tolerated or accepted.
In the balance of his essay Janssens basically
reiterates the thesis of his enormously influential 1972 article "Ontic
Evil and Moral Evil" (Louvain Studies 4 [Fall, 1972] 115-156) in
which he had argued that the proportionalist method of making moral judgments
(the method he advances in this article and the method repudiated in Veritatis
Splendor) was central to the teaching of St. Thomas. According to Janssens,
for St. Thomas one could not make a moral judgment about a human act without
taking into account not only the "object" [which Janssens, in his
1972 article identified with the 'external act' considered as a material event]
but also the proportionality of the means chosen (the 'object') to the final
end intended by the agent, which served as the "form" of the entire
moral act. Here he basically reiterates this thesis, illustrating it by St.
Thomas's teaching on killing in self-defense (p. 109). According to Janssens in
his 1972 article, Aquinas taught that one could rightly "intend" the
death of the assailant (an ontic evil) as the "means" to defend
oneself from unprovoked attack.
It is not, I think, necessary to explore this
matter in extent here. I have previously shown in detail how Janssens has
misconstrued Thomas's teaching on the morality of human acts (cf. my
"Aquinas and Janssens on the Moral Meaning of Human Acts," Thomist
48 [October 1984] 566-606) and need not here rehearse what was said there.
In his contribution Janssens insists that
"official church documents" [=documents of the Magisterium]
"maintain that contraception...and homosexual acts are intrinsically evil
according to their object. All of these terms refer simply to factual events"
(p. 110; emphasis added). This is sheer nonsense. These terms do not
refer to mere factual events. As we have seen already, John Paul II explicitly
denies that the "moral object" refers to factual events. Rather they
refer to intelligible proposals adopted by choice (what St. Thomas called the
external act as specified morally by the "subject matter with which
it is concerned" or the "materia circa quam", not the mere
material event, or "materia ex qua"). Thus contraception is not a
material event but is rather any freely chosen act which, either in
anticipation of a genital act, in its accomplishment, or in its natural
consequences, "intends to impede procreation" (cf. Humanae vitae,
n. 14). Janssens is setting up a straw man in his critique of the Encyclical. He
in no way shows any inaccuracies in its "assertions."
It is also instructive to compare some passages
in this essay by Janssens, written after the publication of Veritatis
Splendor, with passages in highly influential essays (e.g,, in addition to
"Ontic Evil, Moral Evil" his "Norms and Priorities in a Love
Ethic," Louvain Studies 6 [Spring, 1977] 207-238) published prior
to the Encyclical. In his present essay he seems to say that it is
intrinsically wrong to have sex with someone who is not one's wife (a norm
expressed in merely descriptive, not morally evaluative terms) (cf. p. 105). In
"Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethic," however, he had sharply
distinguished between "formal norms," i.e., norms describing actions
in morally evaluative terms, e.g., having sex with the wrong person,
and "material norms," i.e., norms describing actions in merely
descriptive terms, e.g., having sex with someone who is not one's wife. The
former, i.e., "formal norms" expressed in morally evaluative
language, he had recognized as "absolute," i.e., without exceptions
and the actions proscribed by them as "intrinsically evil." And
obviously they are, because there are no logical exceptions to them. They are
tautological. The latter, i.e., "material norms" expressed in morally
neutral language, are however, so he held, subject to exceptions if the ontic
evil involved in them can be overridden by the greater ontic good one seeks as
one's definitive end. The actions proscribed by them are not intrinsically evil
morally but only ontically. Although some "material
norms" are "practical absolutes" or "virtuously" (sic;
he meant "virtually") absolute, e.g., the norm proscribing rape, they
nonetheless are still merely material norms and are in principle subject
to exceptions (cf. his "Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethic," 216f).
In summary, Janssens' contribution plays on the
differences between legitimate uses of "proportionality" and the use
to which he seeks to put it. It misinterprets the teaching of St. Thomas to
support the thesis that an appeal to proportionality is necessary to evaluate a
human act morally, and fails to come to grips with the central teaching of the
Encyclical.
Bernard Hoose's essay, "Circumstances,
Intentions, and Intrinsically Evil Acts" (pp. 153-168) is a very clever
effort to show that, pace the teaching of John Paul II in Veritatis
Splendor that one can judge an act intrinsically immoral on the basis of
the object rationally chosen without appealing to circumstances and
(further) intentions, it is possible to make moral judgments only by
considering circumstances and (further) intentions.
Hoose centers attention on n. 80 of Veritatis
Splendor where John Paul II appeals to the teaching of Vatican Council II
in Gaudium et spes, n. 27 to show that there are "intrinsically
evil acts" specified by the objects rationally willed and chosen. This
text from Gaudium et spes includes some actions described in morally
evaluative terms (e.g. "subhuman living conditions," "arbitrary
imprisonment," "degrading conditions of work"). It also includes
others described in morally neutral or merely descriptive terms (e.g.,
"abortion," "euthanasia," "voluntary suicide"). Among
the acts described in non-morally evaluative language are
"deportation" and "mutilation." It should be noted,
however, that "deportation" appears immediately after "arbitrary
imprisonment," so that one might infer that the deportation" deemed
immoral by Gaudium et spes is "arbitrary deportation."
Nonetheless, Hoose focuses on the fact that no
morally descriptive adjective precedes "deportation" and
"mutilation," and he then goes on to argue that one cannot say that
"deportation" is intrinsically evil insofar as there can be just
deportations. Similarly, he argues that in the Catholic tradition approved
authors had spoken of justifiable "mutilation." He then concludes
that, since these kinds of actions cannot be determined to be immoral without
taking into account circumstances and ends, no actions can be determined
intrinsically evil merely on the basis of the object chosen (e.g.,
deportation), but can only be evaluated morally if one takes into
account not only the object chosen but also the circumstances and intentions
(i.e., the moral method repudiated by Veritatis Splendor).
I think it is easy to see the massive non
sequitur involved in Hoose's argument. He rightly notes that some
actions, described in nonmorally evaluative terms (e.g., deportation) cannot be
judged morally wrong without considering circumstances and intentions, and then
concludes that no actions described in such way can be judged immoral
without considering circumstances and intentions. Qui nimis probat, nihil
probat.
In addition, Hoose asserts (p. 147, note 10)
that John Ford and Germain Grisez claimed that "the Roman Catholic Church
could not change its teaching regarding the wrongness of such behavior
[contraception] because it would have erred so atrociously and for such a long
time regarding so serious a matter which imposed heavy burdens on people."
Here Hoose is utterly inaccurate. In the essay to which he refers, Ford and
Grisez's "Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary
Magisterium," Theological Studies 39 (1978) 258-312, they argued
that the Church's teaching on the intrinsic immorality of contraception had
been infallibly proposed by the ordinary magisterium according to the criteria
set forth in Lumen Gentium, n. 27. In the section to which Hoose refers
they are showing how the argument they are presenting differs from the
one proposed by Ford in the "Minority Report" of the Papal Commission
for the Study of Population, Family, and Birthrate. The argument Hoose presents
as the one advanced by Ford and Grisez in their 1978 article is the one Ford
had advanced in the "Minority Report," an argument Grisez did not
accept. They discuss it in their 1978 article precisely to show how their
argument in that article differs from the one advanced earlier by Ford. Hoose
utterly misrepresents their position.
From all that has been said, one can conclude,
I believe, that the essays by Sellings, Moore, Jans, Janssens, and Hoose
contained in this collection are all way off the mark. They in no way show
inaccuracies in the "assertions" of Veritatis Splendor.
W.M. (1994)
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[1] On this see Joseph Sellings,
"Moral Teaching, Traditional Teaching, and Humanae Vitae" (a
summary of his "The Reaction to Humanae Vitae: A Study in Special and
Fundamental Theology" [S.T.D. diss., Catholic University of Louvain,
1977), Louvain Studies 7 (1978) 43.
[2] St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent.,
d. 40, 1, 2c: "...voluntas dupliciter potest considerari: vel secundum
quod est intendens, prout in ultimum finem fertur, vel secundum quod est
eligens, prout fertur in obiectum proximum quod in finem ultimum ordinatur. Si
consideretur primo modo, sic malitia voluntatis sufficit ad hoc quod actus
malus esse dicitur: quia quod malo fine agitur malum est. Non autem bonitas voluntatis intendentis
sufficit ad bonitatem actus: quia actus potest esse de se malus, qui nullo modo
bene fieri potest. Si autem consideretur voluntas secundum quod est eligens,
sic universaliter verum est quod a bonitate voluntatis dicitur actus bonus, et
a malitia malus."
[3] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra
gentiles, III, 122: "Non enim Deus a nobis offenditur nisi ex eo
quod contra nostrum bonum agimus."
[4] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
theologiae, 1-2, 94, 2: "omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem
inclinationem ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere
prosequenda..."
[5] Sellings' "review" of the
Grisez volume is found in Louvain Studies (Winter 1993) 379-380.
[6] Here I should note that when the
"Declaration" was published in 1976 I wrote to Archbishop Jerome
Hamer, then secretary of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. I
thanked him for the document and its reaffirmation of the intrinsic evil of all
acts of intentionally killing innocent human beings, even for reasons of mercy.
But I said that, although I understood how the document used the terms
"proportionate" and "disproportionate," I was concerned
that some proponents of the proportionalist method of making moral judgments
(e.g., Janssens) might appeal to this language of the document to support this
moral position. In his reply Archbishop Hamer, after thanking me for my letter,
stressed that the Congregation repudiated proportionalism (as was evident in
its affirmation of the moral absolute proscribing intentionally killing
innocent human beings) and that any appeal to the document to support this
moral theory would be utterly inappropriate. I am sure that a copy of these
letters are in the archives of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith,
with appropriate Prot. numbers.