MAY, William

 An Introduction to Moral Theology

Our Sunday Visitor Press, Huntington 1991.

En 1980 se lamentaba Mons. Delhaye, a la sazón Secretario de la Comisión Teológica Internacional, de que en los últimos años se habían publicado muchos libros de moral a la luz del Concilio, pero pocos con la moral del Concilio Vaticano II.[1] Afortunadamente, ésta situación ha pasado: hoy disponemos ya de un buen número no sólo de estudios monográficos sino de obras generales de teología moral, realmente fieles al espíritu y a la letra del Concilio.[2]

        He querido sin embargo comenzar con este recuerdo, para poner de relieve uno de los méritos de este libro de William May: el constituir un verdadero prototipo de la moral auspicada por el Vaticano II, sea por su modo de nutrirse en la enseñanza de la Sagrada Escritura al tratar cada uno se los argumentos e inspirarlos continuamente en la necesidad del cristiano de dar frutos por la caridad para la vida del mundo; sea porque el autor muestra conocer en profundidad las polémicas subseguidas al Concilio, y se vale de ellas para penetrar en las enseñanzas conciliares, teniendo presentes y saliendo al paso de las dificultades del ambiente.

An Introduction to Moral Theology no sigue el esquema habitual de los cursos o manuales de teología moral fundamental, sino que el autor selecciona algunos temas clave para, desde los, con más claridad e inmediatez abrir las perspectivas exigentes y esperanzadoras de las enseñanza moral de Cristo. De este modo, aclara la raíz de muchas perplejidades éticas: por qué hay quienes no entienden las realidades del espíritu, en qué se engañan y cómo se les puede positivamente ayudar a conocerlas y vivirlas. Y todo en un modo accesible, convincente, como rezumado de la propia vida y experiencia personales. William May es un educador experimentado —padre de siete hijos, y profesor desde hace muchos años en la Universidad Católica de Washington—, que habla de la vida y de lo que interesa a los hombres, no de elucubraciones de la razón raciocinante sino de perspectivas de la inteligencia creyente.

La obra está dividida en seis capítulos. En el primer, Human Dignity, Free Human Action, and Conscience, trata de quién es el hombre, creado a imagen de Dios caído y redimido por Cristo, y cuál es el modo de obrar que le permite dirigirse y acompanar a los demás hacia su plenitud humana de hijos de Dios. En el segundo, The Natural Law and Moral Life, describe la ley inscrita por Dios en nuestra naturaleza, como guía hacia esa plenitud. En el tercero, Moral Absoluts, plantea el nudo crucial del debate ético contemporáneo, raíz de muchas desorientaciones, al haber oscurecido las exigencias radicales que el hombre no puede abandonar si quiere vivir como persona. El capítulo cuarto, Sin and the Moral Life, se ocupa de la autodestrucción y desintegración personal por el pecado, aclarando por qué —otro punto decisivo del actual debate teológico— la Iglesia ha siempre distinguido entre dos tipos de culpa, mortal y venial. El capítulo quinto, Christian Faith and our Moral Live, despliega las perspectivas que abre a la persona el conocimiento de su vocación divina, y en concreto la realidad, los desafíos y las alegrías de su vocación personal a la santidad. El sexto y último aborda otro nudo gordiano de las discusiones odiernas: The Church as Moral Teacher, aclarando las desviaciones de la teología del disenso y cuál sea el valor del Magisterio ordinario. Trataremos seguidamente de describir el contenido sustancial da cada capítulo, valiéndonos lo más posible de las propias palabras del autor.

El prof. May resume así, en la introducción al libro, el contenido del primer capitulo: "I believe that the central biblical themes of crucial significance to moral theology and moral life are those of creation, sin, incarnation and redemption, and eschatology. From Scripture we learn that human persons are utterly unique in the material universe since, of all material creatures, they alone have been created in the image and likeness of God. They are persons whom God wills in themselves. Precisely because they are persons, endowed with intelligence and free choice, they are inwardly capable of receiving from God the gift of his own divine life" (pp. 2-3).

En la obra aparece, pues, desde el principio la doctrina tradicional de la unidad sin confusión entre naturaleza y gracia, y, por ende, el carácter de don inefable de nuestra sobrenatural participación en la misma vida divina:[3] "Every living human body, the one that comes to be when new human life is conceived, is a living image of all-holy God. Moreover, in creating Man, male and female, God created a being inwardly capable of receiving His own life (...) Every human being, therefore, is intrinsically valuable, surpassing in dignity the entire material universe, a being to be revered and respected from the very beginning of its existence. This intrinsic, inalienable dignity proper to human beings is God's gift, in virtue of which every human being, of whatever age or sex or condition, is a being of moral worth, an irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable person. Because this dignity a human being, as Karol Wojtyla has said, 'is the kind of good that does not admit of use and cannot be treated as an object of use and as such a means to an end'. Because of this dignity a human being 'is a good toward which the only adequate response is love'" (pp. 8-9).

En cuanto hemos visto está la primera y radical dignidad de la persona, pero "according to the catholic tradition, as found, for example in St. Thomas Aquinas and in teachings of Vatican Council II" hay una segunda raíz de la dignidad personal: "The second kind of dignity is the dignity to which we are called as intelligent and free persons capable of determining our own lives by our own free choices. This is the dignity that we are to give to ourselves (with the help of God's unfailing grace) by freely chosen to shape our lives and actions in accord with truth. In other words, we give to ourselves this dignity and inwardly participate it by making good moral choices, and such choices are in turn dependent upon true moral judgments. The nature of this dignity was beautifully developed at Vatican Council II, and a brief summary of its teaching will help us grasp the crucial importance of true moral judgments and good moral choices if we are to respect our God-given dignity and participate in the dignity to which are called as intelligent and free persons" (pp. 9-10).

Destacaremos los momentos cruciales de su análisis: a) la innegable existencia de nuestra libertad: "The reality of free choice, so central to the biblical understanding of man, was clearly affirmed by Church Fathers as Agustine and by all the great scholastics. As St. Thomas put the matter, it is only through free choice that human persons are masters of their own actions and inthis way beings made in the image and likeness of God. The great truth that human persons are free to choose what they are to do and, through their choices, to make themselves to be the persons that they are was solemnly defined by the Council of Trent. Vatican Council II stressed that the power of free choice 'is an exceptional sign of the divine image within man' (Gaudium et spes, n. 17)"(p. 13); b) el carácter inmanente de nuestras acciones por las cuales nos hacemos —en la medida en que esto queda en nuestras manos— los hombres que somos: es decir, "the self-determining character of free choices. It is in and through the actions we freely choose to do that we give to ourselves an identity, for weal or woe. This identity abides in us until we make other, contradictory kind of choices (p. 16); c) el papel y el significado de la conciencia, en su triple sentido de juicio o acto de la inteligencia sobre el bien o mal moral de las propias acciones, de sindéresis o hábito de los primeros principios morales y,finalmente, de auto-conciencia profunda del yo: "At this level, in other words,is a mode of self-awareness whereby we are aware of ourselves as moral beings, summoned to give ourselves the dignity to which we are called as intelligent and free beings. This is the level of conscience to which Dignitatis humanae referred when it declared that '... all men...are by their own nature impelled, and are morally bound, to seek the truth' about what they are to do (n. 2)" (pp.21-22).

Algunos han entendido erróneamente que la conciencia —precisamente a este tercer nivel, que llaman conciencia trascendental— decidiría sobre el bien y el mal del propio actuar, sin sujeción a ninguna norma concreta absoluta. Se trata, sin embargo de un error, porque "there is thus the serious obligation, stressed by the Council documents that have already examined, to seek the truth. Our judgment of conscience does not make what we choose to do to be morally right and good; in other words, we are not, through our jugdment of conscience, the arbitrers of good and evil. Our obligation is to conform our judgments of conscience to objective norms of morality, norms that have as their ultimate source, as Dignitatis humanae put it, 'God's divine law-eternal, objective, universal' (n. 3). It is for this reason that the Council Fathers spoke of a 'correct' conscience, declaring, 'the more a correct conscience prevails, the more do persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and try to be guided by objective standards of moral conduct' (Gaudium et spes, n. 16). (p. 24).

Puesto que los hombres son inteligentes y libres, son capaces de participar en el plan de la sabiduria y el amor divinos. Este es el tema del capítulo segundo, la ley natural o modo humano de participar en la ley eterna: "'highest norm of human life is God's divine law-eternal... man has been made by God to participate in this law, with the result that, under the gentle disposition of divine providence, he can come to perceive ever increasingly the unchanging truth' (Dignitatis humanae, n. 3). Man's participation in God's divine and eternal law is precisely what the Catholic theological tradition understands by 'natural law', the law that he discovers 'deep within his conscience' (Gaudium et spes, n. 16). Although they did not use the expression 'natural law' to designate man's participation in God's divine eternal law in these passages from Dignitatis humanae and Gaudium et spes, the Council Fathers clearly had the natural law in mind, for right after saying that 'man has been made by God to participate in this law', they explicitly referred to three texts of St. Thomas; and of these one was obviously uppermost in their mind, for in it Aquinas affirms that all human beings know the immutable truth of the eternal law at least to this extent, that they know the universal principles of the natural law" (p. 33).

El autor divide en tres apartados su análisis de la ley natural: el pensamiento de Santo Tomás (pp. 34-56), el Concilio Vaticano II (pp. 57-63) y los estudios de Grisez-Finnis-Boyle (pp. 63-92). Respecto al primero —analizando la Summa Theologiae— señala que "in the mind of St Thomas law as such not only belong to reason but consists of true propositions or precepts brought into being by reason" (p. 35). Porque "Thomas teaches that all created realities 'participate' in the eternal law. But they do so differently, in accordance with their natures. Nonrational beings participate in the eternal law in a purely passive way insofar as from they receive an 'impression' whereby 'they have inclinations toward their proper acts and ends'. The eternal law is in them inasmuch as they are ruled and measured by it. But human persons, inasmuch as they are intelligent, rational creatures, participate actively in the eternal law, and their active, intelligent participation is precisely what the natural law is.The eternal law is 'in' them both because they are measured by it and because they actively rule and measure their own acts in accordance with it. It is thus'in' them properly and formally as 'law'" (p. 36). Por eso, puede describirse también como "a body or ordered set of true propositions formed by practical reason about what-is-to-be-done" (p. 38). El primero de estos preceptos es "'good is to be done an pursued, and evil is to be avoided. And upon this are based all other precepts of natural law, namely, that all those things belong to natural law that practical reason naturally grasps as goods to be done (or evils to be avoided)'. Continuing, Thomas says that 'good' has the meaning of an end, whereas 'bad' has the opposite meaning. It thus follows that 'reason naturally apprehends as goods, and consequently to be pursued in action, all this things to which man has natural inclination, and things contrary to them (reason naturally apprehends) as evils to be avoided'" (p.39) "To put matters another way, the basic practical principle that good is to be done and pursued, and that its opposite, evil, is to be avoided is specified by identifying real goods of human persons. According to Thomas, there exist within us 'natural inclinations' dynamically directing us toward specific aspects of human well-being and flourishing, and our practical intelligence 'naturally' apprehends as good, and therefore to be pursued in human choice and action, the realities to which these natural inclinations direct us. When he says that practical reason 'naturally' apprehends the goods to which human beings are naturally inclined, Thomas means that there is no need for discursive, syllogistic reasoning in order for us to know them as good. Knowledge of these goods is not innate, but is direct and nondiscursive, given human experience" (p. 39). Luego, tras aclarar la controversia sobre la referencia de Santo Tomás a la definición de Ulpiano (pp. 47-52)4 analiza su pensamiento en la Summa contra Gentes (pp. 52-56), para concluir, "This brief account of St. Thomas's teaching in Book 3 of Summa contra Gentes allows us to have a clear idea of the way he conceived natural law in this work. It is something pertaining to human intelligence. Indeed, it is the way human beings actively participate in the divine law, ordering their own actions in accordance with this law insofar as this is inwardly known by them. This law directs man to live in accordance with reason, i. e., to respect the 'end(s)'for which has been made and to which he is naturally inclined. These 'ends' include, first of all, God, whom man must adore and to whom he must cling in love. But, in a somewhat different way, these 'ends' include life in fellowship and amity with others, proper respect for one's personal integrity and dignity, and proper respect for goods as purposes to which specific sorts of human activity,e.g., genital sex, are ordered. The account in the Summa contra Gentiles, while differently expressed than the account in the Summa Theologiae, is fundamentally the same" (p. 56).

En cuanto al tratamiento de la ley natural en el Concilio Vaticano II,senala: "According to the Council Fathers, 'all men, because they are persons, that is, beings endowed with reason and free will and therefore bearing personal responsability, are both impelled by their nature and bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth' (Dignitatis humanae, n. 2). The truth at stake is, moreover, not an abstract or speculative truth. Indeed, men 'are bounded to adhere to the truth once come to know it and to direct their whole lives in accordance with the demands of truth' (ibid.). Their duty is to 'prudently form right and true judgments of conscience' (ibid., n. 3). The truth in question, in other words, is moral truth, truth known by practical reason —and in knowing it men participate in God's divine and eternal law" (p. 57). Y resume el análisis de los varios textos del Concilio, en el siguiente "set of propositions: 1) The highest norm of human life is God's divine law, eternal, objective, and universal (Dignitatis humanae, n. 3).— 2) Human persons have been so made by God that they are able, by exercising their intelligence, to come to know ever more securely the unchanging truths meant to guide human choices and actions contained in God's law (Dignitatis humanae, n. 3; Gaudium et spes, n. 16).— 3) The human search for unchanging truth is not easy, and it is for this reason that God has, through divine revelation, made His law and its unchanging truths known to mankind and has given His Church the competence and authority to teach mankind the requirements of His divine and natural law (Gaudium et spes, nn. 17,51; Dignitatis humanae, n. 14). — 4) Nonetheless, the unchanging truths of the moral order can be known by human intelligence insofar as this truths are rooted in the being of human persons and in the constitutive elements of human nature[4] (Dignitatis humanae, nn.3,14; Gaudium et spes, nn. 16,17,51). — 5) The divine,eteral law, which is the natural law insofar as it comes to be in the minds of human beings, contains (a) first or common principles and (b) more particular and specific norms trascending historical and cultural situations precisely because they are rooted in constitutive elements of human nature and human persons and conform to the exigencies of human nature and human persons. Among the (a) first or common principles are such principles as good is to be done and evil is to be avoided (cf. Gaudium et spes, n. 16) and human activity should harmonize with the genuine good of human race (cf. ibid. n. 35). Among (b) more particulars and especific norms are those moral absolutes proscribing the killing of the innocent, suicide, torture, and similar kinds of actions (cf. Gaudium et spes, nn. 27, 51, 79-80)" (pp. 62-63).

Particularmente interesante y detallado es el apartado que dedica al pensamiento de Grisez-Finnis-Boyle sobre la ley natural, cuyo contenido resume así: "The natural law consists of an ordered set of true propositions of practical reason. The first set (i) consists of first principles of practical reasoning, of which the fundamental principle is that good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided, a principle that is given specific determinations by identifying the basic forms of human flourishing which are de goods that are to be pursued and realized. These principles of practical reasoning are used in one way or another by everyone who considerers what to do, however unsound his conclusions. The second set (ii) consist of (a) the first principle of morality —which expresses the integral directiveness of all the principles of practical reasoning— and (b) its specifications or modes of responsability. The first principle is that in voluntary action for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will toward integrall fulfillment. Its specifications —the modes of responsability— exclude ways of choosing that ignore, slight, neglect, arbitrarily limit, or damage, destroy, or impede basic human goods. In the light of the first principle of morality and its specifications human persons are able to distinguish between acts reasonable-all— things-considered (and not merely relative-to-a-particular-purpose) and acts that areunreasonable-all-things-considered, i.e., between ways of acting that are morally right and morally wrong. The third set (iii) of natural law propositions, formulated in light of the first and second sets, consist of specific moral norms, of which some are absolute whereas others admit exceptions in light of the principles that gave rise to them to begin with. In addition, the integral directiveness of the first principles of practical reasoning —expressed in the first principle of morality that direct us toward the ideal of integral human fulfillment— provides us with the criterion for establishing moral priorities among our interests in the basics human goods of human existence. When these goods are considered from the perspective of this integral directiveness —the directiveness of unfettered practical reason— the good of religion, or of harmony between human persons and God or the 'more-than-human source of meaning and value' is seen to have a priority insofar as commitment to this goodoffers to human persons an overarching purpose in terms of which they can ordertheir lives as a whole. Thus a commitment to religious truth emerges as the commitment that can integrate the whole of human life when this is conceived in the light of the demands of moral truth" (pp. 87-88). Con ello, concluye May, Grisez-Finnis-Boyle han realizado una significativa contribución al tema de la ley natural, prosiguiendo las bases puestas por Santo Tomás, en tres puntos: a) la identificación de la totalidad de los bienes básicos del hombre, de los que el Aquinate dio solo una enumeración ejemplificativa; b) la distinción entre los principios de la razón práctica y los principios de la moralidad; c) y en orden al procedimiento para especificar las normas morales a través de los modos de responsabilidad (pp. 89-90).

Sin la menor duda, es mérito de estos autores haber vuelto a fundamentar la ley natural en los bienes intrínsecos de la persona (que la segunda escolástica había perdido), y haber prestado con sus estudios una eficaz ayuda a mejor identificar los bienes básicos que integran la perfección del hombre, cuestión decisiva para la determinación de las normas morales específicas, y en particular de los varios preceptos concretos negativos de carácter absoluto o absolutos morales, en los términos que se verán más adelante. También es interesante su estudio sobre los principios morales y su formulación, y en concreto de los modos de responsabilidad. Como es sabido, Santo Tomás habla de la ley natural, por así decirlo, en dos claves: una como dinamismo intrínseco —capacidad, inclinación y exigencia hacia la propia perfección y plenitud— y otra en cuanto formulación racional de esas inclinaciones y exigencias. La presentación de la ley natural como conjunto de preceptos atiende prioritariamente a este segundo aspecto o dimensión, a lo que —con lenguaje del Aquinate al tratar de la Nueva Ley— podríamos llamar el elemento externo o letra de la ley, más que al dinamismo intrínseco del cual es expresión. La formulación del primer principio de la Ley natural y de los "modos de responsabilidad" realizadas por Grisez-Finnis ayuda a reconocer sobre todo los preceptos negativos concretos absolutos o absolutos morales. Sin embargo, nos parece que la moral de virtudes de Santo Tomás sigue proporcionando un camino más rico y completo —en su conjunto— para el discernimiento de las exigencias positivas de la ley moral. Ciertamente, la ley natural se presenta mediante la formulación de principios y normas, pero es ante todo el dinamismo hacia su propia perfección —inscrito por Dios en la naturaleza de la persona, en su deseo del bien sin restricciones y en la inclinación de su inteligencia a la verdad— que se despliega a través de las virtudes. Por eso, Santo Tomás tiene como formulación preferida y comunmente usada del primer principio la del mandamiento del amor a Dios y al prójimo, raíz de todas las virtudes. En Santo Tomás, los primeros principios —el precepto del amor, la regla áurea— son, por así decirlo, más que fórmulas universales ideas en acción inseparables de suyo de todo el despliegue de las virtudes morales, porque éstas no son vistas sólo como simples disposiciones que facilitan cumplir mandatos conocidos sino cual principios activos del conocimiento del bien singular y concreto, además de energía para amarlo adecuadamente. Concluyendo, considero que la exposición de estos autores complementa en algunos puntos la de Santo Tomás, pero, a mi juicio, podría fundirse mejor con ella.

Terminada la exposición de la estructura y fundamento de la ley natural, el autor dedica el capítulo tercero al tema de los absolutos morales, punto importante de la ley natural y centro del actual debate teológico-moral. Posiblemente sea el capítulo más logrado de la obra, en el cual los estudios de Grisez-Finnis sobre la ley natural son más determinantes, y el que confiere a An Introduction to Moral Theology una particular fuerza clarificadora.

La discusión entre los teólogos del disenso y el Magisterio no versa sobre la negativa a reconocer un mal moral en el aborto, la contracepción o el adulterio sino sobre el hecho de que tales actos sean siempre un mal moral, y por tanto estén prohibidos por normas morales absolutas o sin excepción. May precisa cuidadosamente el sentido en que emplea la expresión absolutos morales, paralela a la de actos intrínsecamente ilícitos de uso más corriente en la tradición cristiana: "The expression 'moral absolutes' is used here to refer to moral norms identifying certain tipes of action without employing in their description any moral evaluative terms.[5] Deliberaty killing babies, having sex with someone other than one's spouse, contracepting, and making babies by artificial insemination are examples of types of action specified by norms of this kind. Such norms are called 'absolute' because inconditionally and definitively exclude specifiable kinds of human action as morally justifiable objects of choice. They are said to be true always, under every circumstance (semper et pro [or ad] semper). The type of actions specified by such norms are called 'intrinsically evil acts'" (pp. 117-118).

Un primer importante punto resaltado por el autor, es que la negación de los absolutos morales entre teólogos católicos tiene unos inicios bien recientes y conocidos: "The roots of the rejection of moral absolutes can be found in the reasoning advanced by the authors of the celebrated 'Majority Report' of the Papal Commission for the Study of Population, the Family, and Natality. This commission had been established by Pope John XXIII and, after his death, had been increased in size by Pope Paul VI. Its original purpose was to advise the Holy See about what to say in international organizations about the population problem and proposed solutions to it. But the expanded body undertook to study the whole issue of contraception. The documents of this commission, which were intended, in accord with the mandate given to the commission, solely for the use of the Holy Father, who had the responsibility to assess their worth, were leaked to the public in 1967, plainly with the intent of putting pressure on Pope Paul VI to change the teaching of the Church on contraception. In the papers comprising what came to be called the "Majority Report" of the commission, the authors presented arguments to justify the practice of contraception by married couples.[6] Nevertheles, they insisted, in company with all Catholic moral theologians of the time, that there are moral absolutes (...) Despite their protests, however, it soon became clear that the reasoning they advanced to support their view that married persons could, under given conditions, rightly practice contraception could also be used to justify exceptions to other norms that had been regarded up to that time as absolute by Catholic moral theologians. This point has been conceded by revisionist theologians such as Charles E. Curran"(pp. 118-119).

Concretamente, los argumentos en que se funda el "Majority Report", son fundamentalmente dos: a) primero, lo que llaman el "principio de preferencia" o "principio del bien proporcionado"; todo acto puede realizarse si hay una razón proporcionada para ello: así, quitar la vida a otro es un mal porque —cita literal del Report— "is contrary to right reason unless there is question of a good of a higher order" (p. 119);[7] b) en segundo lugar, y complementando el principio de la razón proporcionada, sostienen que los actos de los cónyuges no deben examinarse aislados, sino en el conjunto de la vida conyugal: su argumento es que "there is a 'material privation' (or what will later be called 'ontic', 'premoral', or 'non moral' evil) in contraceptive activity insofar as it deprives a conjugal act of its procreative potential. Howewer, the contraceptive intervention is only a partial aspect of a whole series of contracepted marital acts, and his entire ensemble 'receives its moral specification from the other finality, which is good in itself (namely, the marital union) an from the fertility of whole conjugal life' (...). Rather, what they are doing —the moral 'object' of their act— is 'the fostering of love responsabily toward generous fecundity'. An this is obviously good, not bad" (p. 121).

A continuación, y antes de pasar a la crítica, May precisa la terminología de los teólogos revisionistas: "First of all, revisionist theologians —among them Franz Bockle, Charles E. Curran, Josef Fuchs, Bernard Haring, Louis Janssens, Richard McCormick, Timothy E. O'Connell, Richard Gula, Franz Scholz, and Bruno Schuller— while denying the existence of moral absolutes in the sense previously described, acknowledge that there are other kinds of moral absolutes. They admit that there are absolutes in the sense of 'transcendent principles' that direct us to those elements of our existence whereby we transcend or surpass the rest of material creation. Thus they acknowledge the absoluteness of such principles as 'One must always act in conformity with love of God and neighbor' and 'One must always act in accordance with right reason'. Similarly, they regard as absolute norms that they call 'formal'. These norms articulate what our inner dispositions and attitudes ought to be. It is thus always true that we should act justly, bravely, chastely, and so on. Such formal norms express the qualities that ought to characterize the morally good person. They are not concerned with specific human acts and choices but rather with the moral being of the agent. In a way they are, as Josef Fuchs has said, 'exhortations rather than norms in the strict sense',[8] and, as Louis Janssens has noted, they 'constitute the absolute element in morals'.[9] Finally, these theologians admit that norms using morally evaluative language to refer to actions that human persons ought never freely choose to do are absolute. Thus, we ought never to murder, because to murder is by definition to kill a person unjustly. Likewise, we ought never to have sex with the wrong person, because such sex is also wrong by definition. Yet norms like this are tautological and do not help us know which specific kinds of killing are unjust or what specific kind of sex is sex with the wrong person, etc. As Fuchs observes, these 'absolute' norms are 'parenetic', not instructive, and simply serve to remind us of what we already know and exhort us to avoid morally wrong actions and to engage in morally right ones.[10] While acknowledging 'absolutes' of the foregoing kind, revisionist theologians deny that there are moral absolutes in the sense of norms universally proscribing specifiable sorts of human action described in morally neutral language. They call such norms 'material' or 'behavioral/material' norms. According to them such norms identify 'physical acts' or 'material acts' or 'behavior', including, in some cases, the 'direct' or immediate effects of such acts, described independently of any of the acting subject's purposes.[11] As one revisionist theologian, Richard Gula, puts it, such 'material norms', 'when stated negatively, point out the kind of conduct which ought to be avoided as far as possible', but all such norms 'ought to be interpreted as containing the implied qualifiers, if there were no further intervening factors, or unles there is a proportionate reason, or all things being equal'" (pp, 122-123).[12]

Además de los dos argumentos del 'Majority Rapport' ya señalados —del "principio del bien proporcionado" y de la "naturaleza del acto humano como totalidad"—, los revisionistas usan un tercer argumento para negar los absolutos morales: la historicidad de la existencia humana. "According to revisionist theologians, material norms are useful generalizations alerting us, as Gula says, to the 'kind of conduct that ought to be avoided as far as possible'.[13] We come to the knowledge of these norms by the collaborative exercise of human intelligence by persons living together in communities on shared human experiences.[14] Since material norms are discovered in this way, it follows that they are affected by human historicity and the openended, on-going character of human experience. Revisionists recognize that there is a 'transcendent', 'transhistorical' and 'transcultural' dimension of human persons, insofar as human persons are called to 'a steadily advancing humanization'.[15] Nonetheless, 'concrete' human nature, by reason of its historicity, is subject to far-reaching changes. It thus follows that no specific material norm, articulated under specific historical conditions, can be true and applicable universally and unchangeably. Nor does it follow from this that these norms are merely subjective and relative. Their objective truth corresponds to the actions they proscribe or prescribe insofar as these are related to the 'whole concrete reality of man' and of the particular, historical society in which people live. Nonetheless, while these norms are true and objective, they cannot be absolute in the sense of being universally true propositions about what human persons ought or ought not to do in every conceivable situation. In fact, as Fuchs has said, 'a strict behavioral norm, stated as a universal, contains unexpressed conditions and qualifications which as such limit its universality'.[16] Since human experience, reflection upon which leads to the formulation of material norms, is itself an on-going, openended process, it follows, as Francis Sullivan put it, that 'we can never exclude the possibility that future experience, hitherto unimagined, might put amoral problem into a new frame of reference which would call for a revision of anorm that, when formulated, could not have taken such new experience into account' " (pp. 129-130).[17]

Luego de su preciso análisis del contenido y de los argumentos de los revisionistas, May los somete a una detallada crítica. Ante todo, señala que sus afirmaciones respecto a lo que la tradición afirma son inexactas: "Revisionist theologians, as we have seen, uniformly refer to moral absolutes as 'material' or 'concrete behavioral' norms. They say that these norms identify 'physicalacts' or 'material acts', including, in some instances, the direct effects of these acts. They maintain that such 'material' acts are physical or material events considered in abstraction of any purpose or intention of their agents. But Catholic theologians who today defend the truth of moral absolutes and those who did so in the past, including St. Thomas Aquinas, offer a much different account of these 'material' or 'behavioral' norms, which they never call 'material' or 'behavioral' norms. According to these theologians —es decir, los seguidores de la tradición patrístico-tomista—, the human acts identified and morally excluded by such norms are not specified independently of the agent's will. Rather, they are specified 'by the object' (ex obiecto), and by 'object' they mean exactly what the agent chooses, i.e., the act to be done or omitted and the proximate result sought in carrying out the choice to do this act. Thus, for example, Pope John Paul II, in Reconciliatio et Poenitentia, referred to a 'doctrine, based on the Decalogue and on the preaching of the Old Testament, and assimilated into the keryma of the Apostles and belonging to the earliest teaching of the Church, and constantly reaffirmed by her up to this day'. What doctrine? The doctrine that 'there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object (propter obiectum)'. The Catholic tradition affirming these moral absolutes held that these norms do not bear upon acts 'in their natural species' but rather upon them 'in their moral species (or genus)' (pp. 131-132). En segundo lugar, niega que "el principio del bien proporcionado" sea una verdad autoevidente, contra lo que parecen pensar los teólogos revisionistas: precisamente, porque la comparación entre la grandeza de los bienes en que se funda sería posible sólo "if they could be reduced to some common denominator such as centimetres, inches, or feets, scales adopted not by discovering a truth about these realities but by an arbitrary act of the will. But the goods involved in moral choice are not reducible to some common denominator. They are simply different and incomparable goods of human persons. Thus the presupposition upon which the alleged 'preference principle' rests is false: one cannot determine, prior to choice, which alternative unambiguously promises 'greater' good. One cannot determine, in a nonarbitrary way, which human goods are greater or lesser. They are all incomparabily good, irreducible aspects of human flourishing and well-being. And the same is true of individual instances of these basic goods of human persons. Who could judge whether Jane Smith's life is a 'greater good' than life of John Jones?" (p. 135). En tercer luar, y respecto al argumento de la totalidad, señala el equívoco en que se funda: "it is true that an act must bee good in its 'totality' or 'wholeness' if it is to be morally good (bonum ex intera causa). But it is not true that we cannot judge that a proposed act is morally bad without taking into account all of its elements, for if we know that any of its elements is bad (la intención o la obra, el fin o el objeto), we can know that the whole act is morally vitiated" (p. 139).

Resta el argumento de la historicidad de la existencia humana. May lo describe primero con las palabras de Sullivan, apenas referidas, sobre la fundación del conocimiento humano en la experiencia realizada en comunidades concretas, lo que implicaría siempre la posibilidad de nuevas inimaginadas experiencias, que obligarían a reformular toda norma concreta e imposibilitarían declarar ninguna como definitiva (p. 141). Y sigue la crítica precisa: "But revisionist theologians do not explain clearly what 'concrete', as opposed to 'trascendant', human nature means. They do not show how fundamental human goods, such as life itself, knowledge of the truth, friendship, and so forth, might cease to be good and perfective of human persons, nor do they explain how their claim about radical change in human nature is compatible with the unity of the human raceand our solidarity with Christ. They fail to show how this claim can be harmonized with such basic truhts of Catholic faith as, for instance, that 'all human beings... have the same nature and the same origin'[18] a 'common nature',[19] and the 'same calling and destiny', and so, being fundamentally equal both in nature and in supernatural calling, can be citizens of the one people of God regardlessof race or place or time".[20] Thus the denial of moral absolutes on the alleged claim that there is a radical change in concrete human nature because of human 'historicity' simply cannot be sustained" (pp. 142-143).

Finalmente, May pone de relieve las razones profundas que sustentan la existencia de los absolutos morales, según la constante tradición de la Iglesia. El tema se aclara si se tiene en cuenta la distinción entre las exigencias afirmativas y negativas de la vocación cristiana: "Because the human person's vocation is to love, even as he or she has been and is loved by God in Christ, it is not possible to say, affirmatively, precisely what love requires, for its affirmative obligations must be discovered by us in our creative endeavor to grow daily in love of God and neighbor. But moral absolutes show us what love cannot mean: it cannot mean that we deliberately set our wills against the good gifts that God wills to flourish in his children and close our hearts to our neighbors. Each true specific moral absolute summons each person to revere the goods intrinsic to human persons. Human persons, each in his or her corporeal and spiritual unity (Gaudium et spes, n. 14), are the only earthly creatures God has willed for themselves (Gaudium et spes, n. 24). Respect for human persons, each for his or her own sake, is therefore required by the Creator's design, and is aprimary element in love of God and of one's neighbor as oneself. Such a respectand reverence is, moreover, a primary demand of that divine dignity to which Christ has raised human nature by assuming it (Gaudium et spes, n. 22)" (p.149)[21].

El capítulo cuarto aborda el tema del pecado, con el propósito "to present in some depth the meaning of personal sin (...) The major concerns of this chapter, therefore, are with (1) the core meaning of sin, (2) the distinction between mortal and venial sin and the basis of this distinction, and (3) the effect of sin on our moral life" (p. 170).

May comienza por presentar el sentido del pecado en la Biblia. "The story of the 'fall' of Adam and Eve in Genesis 3.1-14 is a dramatic portrayal of the reality of sin and its essential features. Our protoparents deliberately violate a knwon precept of God (Gn 3.3-6). Their outward act of disobedience is an expression of their inner act of rebellion; they are moved to sin partially by suspicion about God's love for them, partially by frustration over the limits to their liberty imposed by God's precept, and partially by desire for the immediate good, 'knowledge of good and evil,' promised by the performance of the sinful act. Their rebellious deed harms them (Gn 3.7) and alienates them from God, from one another, and from themselves (Gn 3.8-24). Faced with their sin, they try in vain to defend themselves with specious rationalizations (Gn 3.8-15), but nothing they can do can prevent the disastrous effects of their sin (Gn 3.14-24). The idea that sin is a perverse revolt against God, so dramatically set forth in the story of the fall, is central to the Old Testament's understanding of sin. The Old Testament consistently regards sin as a wicked rebellion against the Lord (Nm 14.9; Dt 28.15), a contemptuous spurning of God (2 Sm 12.10; Is 1.4; 43.24; Mi 4.6). When seen from the perspective of God's covenant with His people, sin is recognized as an act of unfaithfulness and adultery (Is 24.5; 48.8; Jer 3.20; 9.1; Ez 16.59; Ho 3.1). When viewed from the perspective of divine wisdom, sin is branded 'foolishness' (Dt 32.6; Is 29.11; Prv 1.7)(...) Sin springs from the 'heart' of a person, and as such is an act involving a personal, inner, and enduring wrong (1 Sm 16.7; Jer 4.4; Ez 11.19; Ps 51), a view of sin reaffirmed most clearly in the New Testament (Mk 7.20-23 and par.)"(pp. 170-171). Luego, cuida de aclarar que "Scriptures understand sin to bee essentially an offense against God. Nonetheless, sin does not hurt or harm God in His inner being, for God as the wholly transcendent One can in no way be harmed by the actions of His creatures. Rather, sin harms the sinner (Jb 35.6;Is 59.1-2; Jer 7.8, 19). Still, sin does wound God in His 'image,' i.e., in the human persons He has made to share in His life. Inasmuch as it is a refusal by sinners to let themselves be loved by God, sin in a certain sense, as the biblical scholar Stanislaus Lyonnet has observed, harms the 'God who suffers from not being loved, whom love has, so to speak, rendered vulnerable' (p. 173). Finalmente, señala que "the New Testament takes up and deepens these Old Testament themes on the reality and evil of sin. Because of its more profound grasp of theloving intimacy that God wills to share with His children, the New Testament deepens the Old Testament understanding of sin as separation from God. The Father so loves us that He sends His only-begotten Son to be with us and for us, actively seeking to reconcile sinners with Himself, loving sinners even while Heis being repudiated by them. Thus sin is a refusal of the Father's love (Lk 25), a refusal rooted in the heart, in the free, self-determining choice of the sinner to reject God's offer of grace and friendship" (pp. 173-174).

Otra perspectiva fundamental del Nuevo Testamento es la de presentar siempre el pecado en el clima de una llamada a la conversión: "the concept of sin is closely linked to the concept of conversion. Jesus begins His public life by calling people to repentance (Mk 1.4, 15; Mt 3.7-10; Lk 3.7). As the biblical scholar Johannes Bauer observes, 'this presupposes that the men to whom [Jesus'spreaching] is addressed have already turned away from God. It is precisely in this turning away from God that sin consists. It is disobedience to God (Lk 15.21) and lawlessness (Mt 7.23; 13.41)'. Just as we turn to God and cleave to Him through the act of conversion, so by sinning we turn away from Him" (p. 174). Además, el Nuevo Testamento subraya la esclavitud engendrada por el pecado: "Another point (...) in the New Testament teaching on sin is that we are lost and slaves to sin without God's help. Left to our own resources we cannot live long without sin, for it is God who guides us on the path of righteousness (cf. Rom 1-5). If we abandon God through sin, we are like the prodigal son and the lost sheep in the parable of Luke's gospel (Lk 15). But God is our friend, our savior, our redeemer. The very name Jesus means salvation, for He is the one sent by the Father to redeem us and to reconcile us to the Father" (p. 174).

Desde estas bases aborda la crítica de legalismo, que algunos dirigen a la tradición cristiana. Tal legalismo, dicen, se mostraría en la conocida definición agustiniana del pecado como "algo dicho, hecho o deseado contra la ley eterna". Pero, en realidad, tal definición se presenta como "too 'legalistic'" sólo cuando se tiene una concepción errada de la ley divina, y se piensa que San Agustín concibe el pecado "as basically the infraction of some externally imposed norm". En tal perspectiva, "the repudiation of 'legalism' by these theologians is quite justified. Moral principles and norms are not arbitrary rules imposed upon human liberty; they are rather truths in whose light good choices can be made. But if we keep in mind the traditional Catholic understanding of 'law' as a wise and loving ordering of human persons to the goods —and the Good— perfective of them, we can see the good sense of this Augustinian definition of sin (...) The Council said, 'Man has been made by God to participate in this law, with the result that, under the gentle disposition of divine providence, he can come to perceive ever more increasingly the unchanging truth' (Dignitatis humanae, n. 3; cf. Gaudium et spes, nn. 16-17) (...) The natural law is the way in which human persons 'participate' in God's divine and eternal law. Through the natural law human persons come to an ever deeper understanding of what they are to do if they are to be fully the beings God wills them to be. In short, the eternal law is God's wise and loving plan; for the good of human persons, and so great is His love and respect for them that He has made them able to share actively in His loving and wise plan so that they are not only ruled and messured by it but are inwardly capable of shaping their choices and actions in accordance with its truth. When 'eternal law' is understood in this non legalistic way, we can understand how sin is, in essence, a morally evil act, i.e., a freely chosen act known to be contrary to the eternal law as this is made manifest in our conscience (Dignitatis humanae, n. 3; Gaudium et spes, n. 16). As morally evil, the freely chosen act is deprived of the goodness it can and ought to have. As an evil or privation in the moral order, the sinful act blocks the fulfillment of human persons on every level of existence, harming and twisting the person in his or her depths (Gaudium et spes, n. 27), damaging human community, and rupturing the relationship that God wills should exist between Himself and human kind (see Gaudium et spes, n. 13) (...) Sin, in other words, is a deliberately chosen act known to violate the basic norm of human activity, namely, that such activity, 'in accord with the divine plan and will, should harmonize with the authentic good of the human race, and allow men as individuals and as members of society to pursue their total vocation and fulfill it' (Gaudium et spes, n. 35) (pp. 177-178). Lejos de ser legalística, la concepción cristiana del pecado lo muestra en su realidad intrínseca de voluntaria y culpable auto-destrucción de la persona.

De ahí, la presentación en profundidad de la dimensión social del pecado. Precisamente, porque "the inner core of sin is a free, self-determining choice that abides within the person, the reality of sin, traditionally termed the 'guilt' or 'stain' of sin, remains within the sinner. In short, we make ourselves to be the persons we are by the choices that we freely make. In every sinful choice we make ourselves to be sinners and guilty in the sight of the Lord. This perduring of sin within the sinner is what is meant by the 'state' of sin or condition of sinfulness. Jesus summons us to recognize our sinfulness and to have a change of heart, metanoia, a conversion, which consists in a newself-determining choice whereby, in response to and with the help of God's unfailing and healing grace, we give to ourselves the identity of repentant sinners, of persons who have been reconciled to God. Sin persists in the being of the person who sins, and one morally evil commitment can lead to many morally wicked acts insofar as through the free choice to sin one has disposed oneself to act sinfully. To put this another way: sin is not simply deviation in isolated pieces of external behavior; it is evil in the existential domain and extends to all that exists by or is affected by sinful choices. In addition, when the sinner is a baptized persona there is, as was already noted, an 'ecclesial' element in sin —the sinner's sin affects not just the sinner but the whole Church—. Through baptism we become one body with Jesus, members of His body, the Church. Thus, as St. Paul stressed so dramatically in 1 Corinthians 6, when a Christian has sex with a whore he joins to her not only his own body but the body of Christ as well; his sin is not only one of impurity but also one of defiling the Church. There is thus a sacriligeous aspect to the sinful choices of those who have, through baptism, become one body with Christ. All this helps us to see the social significance of sin. The sinful choices of individuals, when tolerated and accepted by the society in which they live, soon become the practices of the society. They become embedded in its laws and customs, its way of life, its way of mediating reality to its people. Thus it is right to consider sin social as well as personal. But we must keep in mind that every social sin originates in and is perpetrated by individual person's sinful choices. Particular persons, as Pope John Paul II has emphasized, are responsible for initiating and maintaining such social evils as the oppression of minorities, unjust wars, the manipulation of communications, etc." (182-183).

Respecto a la distinción entre pecado venial y mortal, que los revisionistas han querido poner en discusión, May nota que "in the New Testament Jesus sharply distinguishes between the 'beam' in the hypocrite's eye and the 'mote' in the eye of the hypocrite's brother (Mt 7.5), and it is evident that He considers the hypocrite's sin far grave than the sin of one whom the hypocrite criticizes. Moreover, in the prayer He taught His disciples, He asks them to beg forgiveness for their daily 'debts' or transgressions (Mt 6.12; Lk 11.4), while He threatens others with hell's fire for their sins (Mt 23.33). The epistles distinguish between the daily sins in which even those regenerated in baptism can be guilty and those offenses which exclude one from the kingdom of heaven (contrast James 3.2 and 1 Jn 1.8 with 1 Cor 6.9-10 and Gal 5.19-21)" (p. 185). Los defensores de la llamada opción fundamental niegan esta distinción sosteniendo que "a sin is 'mortal' only when there is a fundamental option against God and His love (or against some other Ultimate). Mortal sin, in other words, involves the exercise of fundamental or basic freedom. The distinction between grave and light matter is relevant to the distinction between mortal and venial sin insofar as grave matter, according to the proponents of fundamental option, is the sort of thing likely to be en occasion for making or reversing one's fundamental option. Actions not likely to change one's fundamental disposition toward or against God are 'light' matter. 'Grave' and 'light' matter can be used to name not only morally evil acts but also morally good ones (...) Still, proponents of this view recognize that one can change one's stance before God in particular acts of free choice. In other words, according to the proponents of fundamental option theory, grave matter is a 'sign' that one's fundamental freedom may be at stake. Nonetheless, according to its advocates, one could freely choose to engage in an act that one knows involves grave matter, e.g., committing adultery or deliberately killing an innocent human being, and still not violate one's fundamental option toward God (or some Ultimate). Thus advocates of this position frequently distinguish between three kinds of sin: venial, in which only light matter is involved or in which one's freedom of choice is inhibited or one's knowledge is not clear; grave sins, which entail grave matter knowingly and freely chosen; and mortal sin, which requires that one exercise one's basic or fundamental freedom by taking a stance totally opposed to God (or some Ultimate)" (pp. 192-193). Sigue luego la crítica ajustada y precisa: "fundamental option theories, which either relocate self-determination from free choice to an exercise of basic freedom distinct from free choice or hold that we are self-determined only by some free choices and not by all of our free choices, fail to take seriously the reality of free choice. As we have seen before, we make or break our lives as moral beings in and through the free choices that we make in our daily lives. We become liars, adulterers, cheaters, murderers, etc. in freely choosing to lie, commit adultery, cheat, kill the innocent, etc. As has been said over and over again, at the heart of human actions is a free, self-determining choice, and this choice abides in us until contradictory choices are made. As St. Thomas said, 'to act (i.e., to choose to do something) is an action abiding in the agent' (Summa Theologiae, 1-2, 57, 4). Fundamental option theory fails adequately to take into account the self-determinin significance of the free choices we make in our daily lives" (p. 194).

El quinto capítulo está dedicado mostrar el lugar de la fe en nuestra vida moral. No se plantea cuando debemos hacer actos de fe bajo pena de pecado, sino como la fe debe inspirar toda la vida del cristiano. "According to Catholic faith Jesus Christ our Lord is the 'center and goal of the whole history of mankind' (Gaudium et spes, n. 10). Christ is the one who 'fully reveals men to himself' (Gaudium et spes, n. 22). He is the 'perfect man' (Gaudium et spes nn.22, 38, 41, 45), in whom 'human nature is assumed, not annulled' (Gaudium et spes, n. 22). He is the one who 'by his incarnation has somehow united all men with himself' (Gaudium et spes n. 22; Redemptor hominis, nn. 13, 18) (...) Christ is our redeemer, our savior, and by uniting our lives with his we can in truth become fully the beings his Father wills us to be. The purpose of this chapter is thus to investigate the meaning of our lives as moral beings who have, through baptism, become 'one' with Christ. Its purpose is to see how the 'natural law' is brought to fulfillment and completion by the gospel 'law' of Christ'' (p. 207).

Para desarrollar el tema, el autor trata de los siguientes puntos: "1.the existential context within which our struggle to live morally good lives issituated; 2. Jesus Christ, the foundation of Christian moral life; 3. the meaning of our baptismal commitment and of our personal vocation to follow Christ; 4. the specific nature of Christian love as the principle of the moral lives of Christians; 5. the Lord's 'Sermon on the mount,' with its beatitudes, as the 'charter of Christian ethics'; 6. the question of specific Christian norms; and 7. the 'practicality' of the Christian moral life" (pp. 207-208).

Destacaremos los momentos salientes. Comienza por describir nuestra vida nueva en Cristo: "Jesus, Vatican Council II instructs us, 'fully reveals man to himself' (Gaudium et spes, n. 22). He does so because he is the center of human history, the one who holds primacy of place in God's loving plan for human persons and, indeed, for the whole created universe. This is clearly the central message of the New Testament, a message eloquently summarized by St. Paul in his words to the Colossians (Col. 1, l5-22)(...) Jesus is true God and true man. Heis true God, for 'in him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell.' He is God's eternal, unbegotten 'Word' (cf. Jn 1.1). And Jesus is true man, for he is God's eternal Word made flesh, i.e., man (cf. Jn 1.14). 'Born of a woman' (Gal4.4), he is 'like his brothers in every respect' (Heb 2.17), 'tempted as we are, yet without sinning' (Heb 4.15). Insofar as he is man, Jesus achieves human ful-fillment by living a perfect human life, one manifesting God's goodness in a unique and special way: 'I glorified you on earth, having accomplished the work you gave me to do' (Jn 17.4). And his Father crowns his work by raising him —and all persons who are united with him— from the dead. Indeed, as St. Paul teaches us, 'Christ has in fact been raised from the dead, the first fruits of all who have fallen asleep. Death came through one man and in the same way the resurrection of the dead has come through one man. Just as all men die in Adam, so all men will be brought to life in Christ ' (1 Cor 15, 20-22). Again, as man, Jesus is the 'first-born of all creation' (Col 1.15), and is completed by creation united under him: God 'has let us know the mystery of his purpose, the hidden plan he so kindly made in Christ from the beginning to act upon when the times had run their course to the end; that he would bring everything together under Christ as head, everything in the heavens and everything on earth' (Eph1,9-10; Eph 1,22-23)" (pp. 214-216).

En suma, Cristo es el fundamento de la vida cristiana, "for the life we now are empowered to live is in reality a divine life as well as a human life. Just as Jesus fully shared our humanity and our human life so we, by being engrafted into the 'vine' which is Christ (cf. Jn 15.1-11), really share his divinity. In him we are literally divinized, and our life in union with God begins here and now, to be brought to fulfillment in the heavenly kingdom when, 'with death conquered the children of God will be raised in Christ and what was sown in weakness and dishonor will put on the imperishable' (cf. 1 Cor 15.42,53); charity and its works will remain (cfr. 1 Cor 13.8; 3.14), and all of creation (cf. Rom 8.19-21), which God made for man, will be set free from its bondage to decay' (Gaudium et spes, n. 39). Although our life in union with Jesus and, in, with, and through him, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, will reachits fulfillment only on the day of the resurrection, it is absolutely essential to realize that this divine life is already, here and now, present within us. We are, now, God's children; the divine nature has been communicated to us. While always remaining human, we really share in Christ's divinity. We are literally 'other Christs', truly his brothers and sisters and in, with, and through him, God's very children. We receive this divine life in baptism, and this divine life is nurtured by the heavenly food God wills to give us, the body and blood of his Son, our Redeemer and Brother, Jesus Christ. From the earliest times Christian faith has held that eating this food differs markedly from eating other food. When we eat ordinary food we transform it into ourselves. But when we ingest Jesus' living body, 'he makes our mortal flesh come alive with his glorious resurrection life', precisely because ''the partaking of the body and blood of Christ does nothing other than transform us into that which we consume''(Lumen gentium, n. 26, citing St. Leo the Great) (pp. 217-218).

Esta nueva vida en Cristo entraña una vocación: la vocación a la santidad común a todos los bautizados, pero que es en cada uno personal, y exige nuestro empeño por corresponder. "Our life as Christians begins when, in living faith, we accept God's word (1 Thes 1.6; 2.13; Eph 1.13), which the Gospels compare to a seed sown in good soil (Mt 13.23; Mk 4.20; Lk B.15), and which Paul regards as a continually active power in believers (1 Thes 2.13), having an inner power to bear fruit and grow (Col 1.5f; Eph 1.13; 2 Cor 6.1). But it is not enough simply to have received the word. The Christian's baptismal commitment requires him or her to take up the 'sword given by the Spirit' and use it as a weapon in the spiritual combat (Eph 6. 17). God is indeed our Savior and Redeemer. It is through his initiative that we are now, by virtue of the love he has poured into our hearts, saved (Ti 3.5; Eph 2.5, 8; 1 Cor 15.1). He has sanctified us (1 Cor 1.2; 6.11), filling us with the fullness of Christ (Col 1.10), making us new men and women (Eph 2.15), clothing us in Christ (Gal 3.'7) and making us new creatures (2 Cor 5.17), pouring his love into us through the Holy Spirit (Rom 5.5), so that we are indeed called by him and chosen (Rom 1.6; 8.28,33; 1 Cor 1.24; Col 3.12) and made into his children, the children of light (Eph5.8; 1 Thes 5.5; 1 Jn 3.1). But God's work in us is not completed by baptism. God continues to save us (1 Cor l.la3; 2 Cor 2.15), to make us holy and blameless (1 Thes 5.23; .13). And we are called and empowered by his grace to respond freely and be his co-workers in perfecting our holiness (2 Cor 7.1 ) by whole heartedly dedicating ourselves to a life of righteousness and sanctification (Rom, 6.19). It is our task continually to 'put on the Lord Jesus Christ' (Rom 13.14), casting off the works of darkness and putting on the armor of light (Rom 13.2; Eph 5.8-11). As the children of the God who is love our call and commitment is to 'abide in him' (1 Jn 2.28; 4.13 f) and walk in the light and not in darkness (1 Jn 1.7). By reason of our baptismal commitment we are, in short, 'to be what we are!'. We are to image Christ in our lives, to cooperate with him in redeeming others and, indeed, in redeeming the entire cosmos. We are to lead apostolic lives, for like the Apostles we too are sent into the world in the love and service of the Lord (cfr. the final words of the Mass, when we are sent forth to bring God's saving work to others by our own daily deeds)" (pp. 226-227)

El autor se detiene seguidamente en mostrar que el amor de caridad es el primer principio del obrar cristiano (Christian Love, the Principle of Our Life in Christ: pp. 230-233), y como las Bienaventuranzas especifican los requirimientos del amor cristiano (The Beatitudes. Specifiying the Requirements of Christian Love: pp. 233-239). May sigue, a este propósito, el pensamiento de Grisez-Finnis-Boyle. De nuevo subrayaría mi opinión de que los estudios de estos autores, cuyo interés es innegable, al centrar la guía de la conducta moral fundamentalmente en los modos de responsabilidad, proporcionan un esquema menos abierto que el de Santo Tomás. En el Doctor Angélico la guía de la vida cristiana se apoya en una más rica multiplicidad de elementos o figuras, apta a mostrar mejor sea la interrelación entre la acción de Dios y la correspondencia de la criatura, sea la unidad entre fe y obras, doctrina y vida, sabiduría y amor, sea, en fin, la activa-pasividad propia del abandono cristiano en Dios. Para Santo Tomás, el primer principio activo, que desarrolla el dinamismo intrínseco de ley natural y de la ley Nueva de la gracia, abriendo simultáneamente el camino al "conocimiento y al amor del bien", son las virtudes morales humanas[22] y sobrenaturales (vistas, ambas, no sólo como 'habilidades' para cumplir mandatos sino también y antes para el mismo descubrir el bien o valor moral: sólo el virtuoso juzga rectamente del contenido de la virtud). Las virtudes, como principio de conocimiento y amor del bien, están complementadas por un segundo tipo de hábitos operativos, los dones del Espíritu Santo, que capacitan al creyente a entender y seguir con docilidad las iniciativas del Espíritu, dado que nuestra mente (inteligencia y voluntad) aún informada por las virtudes teologales resta torpe para obrar según nuestra altísima condición de hijos de Dios. Por otra parte, y en una línea de indicadores más bien externos, están los Preceptos sobre lo que debemos obrar y evitar; pero los preceptos son sólo una parte del conjunto enseñanzas sapienciales sobre la conducta ética, propio de la Biblia, que resultan irreducibles a una formulación en solas normas, pues contienen otra serie de modos importantísimo de ilustrar la conducta, expuestos en forma de máximas —no raramente paradójicas—, parábolas, ejemplos, etc. En fin, forman parte de esa guía y nos ayudan a tomar las actitudes adecuadas, las promesas sobre cuanto el Señor quiere que alcancemos y está dispuesto a obrar en nosotros si procuramos ser fieles (la vida eterna y la realización del Reino de Dios, ya incoado en la tierra, donde obra en las almas la felicidad, la paz, y hace que rindan los frutos del Espíritu) y las bienaventuranzas, que no sólo entrañan actitudes que el Señor nos pide, sino que anuncian y describen las pruebas —previniendo así nuestro desconcierto— con que Dios trabajará la tierra árida de nuestra alma, hasta convertirla en un campo bien dispuesto para que la semilla dé fruto al ciento por uno. En suma, sin disminuir el valor de los estudios de Grisez-Finnis, a mi juicio, no rendirán todo cuanto pueden sino engarzándose mejor en el conjunto de la tradición patrístico-tomista.

Este capítulo concluye con un sugestivo apartado sobre The Practicability of the Christian Moral Life, otra de las cuestiones debatidas por la moral revisionista: imposible para el hombre con sus solas fuerzas, la grandeza moral del cristianismo es sin embargo accesible a quien usa los medios que el Señor proporciona. "If we are, moreover, to live our lives as faithful followers of Jesus, we need to make use of the aids he wills to give us in our struggle. We cannot live as Christians unless, like Jesus himself, we give ourselves over to preyer, to communion with God, in a colloquy in which we present to him our needs and ask him for his help, praising and thanking him for his boundless goodness to us. We need, above all, to remain close to Jesus by receiving with devotion and love his body and blood in the Eucharist and coming to him in the confessional when we have sinned or have need of advice as to what we ought to do to live as his faithful disciples. Jesus, our best and wisest friend, is the great 'enabling factor' of our moral lives, but he cannot help us if we do not let him do so. Long ago St. Augustine said, 'God does not command the impossible, but by commanding he admonishes you that you should do what you can and beg him for what you cannot'. At the Council of Trent the Church made these words of St. Augustine its own (DS 1536). While the Christian life may at times seem to be an impossible ideal, it is possible because of God's grace. For fallen mankind it cannot be attained, but for men and women who have been regenerated in the waters of baptism and nourished with the body and blood of Christ it can. For, like Jesus, their one desire is to do what is pleasing to the Father. 'The love of God,' wrote the uthor of the First Epistle of John, 'is this, that we keep his commandments. And his commandments are not burdensome; for whoever is begotten of God conquers the world' (1 Jn 5.3-4). Commenting on this text, St. Augustine wrote, 'These commandments are not burdensome to one who loves, but they are so to one who does not'. St. Thomas referred to this text of Scripture and Augustine's comment on it when he took up the question, is the New law of love more burdensome than the old law? He noted that it is indeed more difficult to govern one's inner choices in accord with the demands of Christian love than to control one's external actions. But he went on to say that the difficulty is present when one lacks the inner power or virtue to live the life of Christian love. But, and this is his major point, for the virtuous person, the one into whom God's own love has been poured and who abides in this love, what is seemingly difficult becomes easy and light. Thus Jesus, who demands that his disciples take up their cross daily and follow him, likewise says, 'Take my yoke upon you and learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart, and you will find rest for yourselves. For my yoke is easy, and my burden light' (Matt 11.29-30) (pp.247-248).

El sexto y último capítulo versa sobre The Church as Moral Teacher. "Catholics believe that the Church is the 'pillar of truth' (cf. 1 Tim 3.15). Jesus promised His apostles that He would not leave them orphans and that He would send His Holy Spirit to assist them (cf. Jn 14.16-17, 26; 15.26-27; 16.7-15; 20.21-22; Lk 24.49; Acts 1.8; 2.1-4). The role of the Holy Spirit paralleled that of the apostles; both bore witness to Jesus and communicated the truth revealed in Him to the first Christian communities (cf. J 15.26-27). The Spirit revealed nothing new; rather, He helped the apostles to appropriate God's revelation in Jesus (cf. Jn 16.13-15). Within the Church the apostles held first place (cf. 1 Co 12.28), for upon them the Church is established, both now and forever (cf. Eph 2.20; Rev 1.8, 2n). The apostles were chosen to receive God's revelation in Jesus, but this revelation was not meant for them alone but for all human kind, to whom Jesus sent them to teach His truth (cf. Mat 28.20). The apostolic preaching, through which the revelation given by our Lord was communicated to the apostolic Church, was, as Vatican Council II affirmed, 'to be preserved in a continuous line of succession until the end of time. Hence, the apostles, in handing on what they themselves had received, warn the faithful to maintain the traditions which they had learned either by word of mouth or by letter (cf. 2 Th 2.15); and they warn the faithful to fight hard for the faith that had been handed over to them once and for all (cf. Jude 3). What was handed on by the apostles comprises everything that serves to make the People of God live their lives in holyness and increase their faith. In this way the Church, in her doctrine, life and worship, perpetuates and transmits to every generation all that she herself is, all that she believes" (Dei Verbum, n. 8) (pp. 257-258). "In short, the magisterium, understood precisely as the authority to teach in in the name of Christ the truths of faith and 'everything that serves to make the People of God live their lives in holiness' (Dei Verbum, n. 8) is entrusted to the college of bishops under the headship of the Roman Pontiff. It is, moreover, necessary to emphasize, as did St. Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages, that this teaching office is essentially and primarily pastoral in nature, charged with the cura animarum, the 'care of souls'. It is not, as some contemporary theologians seem to hold, primarily 'jurisdictional' in character, concerned with Church discipline and order. It is concerned rather with truths of both faith and morals" (p. 259).

May entra luego en el examen de las dos formas del Magisterio infalible: el extraordinario, constituido por las definiciones solemnes de un Concilio ecuménico o las declaraciones "ex cathedra" del Romano Pontífice, y, en segundo lugar, el Magisterio ordinario y universal, conforme a Lumen gentium 25 (en cuyas seculares enseñanzas se encuentran contenidas prácticamente la totalidad de las normas morales absolutas: punto capital, sobre el que luego volveremos). El restante Magisterio auténtico no es de suyo infalible, "but it is necessary to understand precisely what this term means. It is a technical one to designate magisterial teaching that are authoritatively proposed, and proposed as true and certain, but not taught as absolutely irreformable. Teachings of this kind are not to be regarded as 'fallible' teachings, as if they were merely probable opinions or expressions of some 'party line' or merely 'official' policy. Rather, teachings, whether of faith or morals, proposed in this way are taught by the magisterium as truths that the faithful, including theologians, are to accept and in the light of which they are to shape inwardly their choices and actions. These teachings, precisely because they are taught with the more-than-human authority vested in the magisterium by the will of Christ, express the 'mind' of Christ on the matters in question" (p. 262). Aunque estas enseñanzas no liguen directamente la fe —quisiera subrayarlo como comentario—, se dirigen también a la fe del creyente, en cuanto es la fe —como virtud, como principio operativo— la que nos mueve a asentir a la enseñanza de quienes tienen, por voluntad de Cristo, la Autoridad en la Iglesia.

En segundo lugar, el autor se ocupa de la existencia de normas morales concretas enseñadas infaliblemente. Retoma, pues, desde otro ángulo la cuestión de los absolutos morales. Remitiendo a cuanto ha dicho en el capítulo tercero, subraya que la existencia de tales enseñanzas era pacíficamente admitida antes de la Humanae vitae, por ejemplo, por el mismo Rahner[23] antes del 1968. "I believe —and so do other theologians— that the core of Catholic moral teaching, as summarized by the precepts of the Decalogue (the Ten Commandments), precisely as these precepts have been traditionally understood within the Church, has been taught infallibly by the magisterium in the day-to-day ordinary exercise of the authority divinely invested in it. We are not deliberately to kill innocent human beings; we are not to fornicate, commit adultery, engage in sodomy; we are not to steal; we are not to perjure ourselves. Note that I say that the core of Catholic moral teaching is summarized in the precepts of the Decalogue as these have been traditionally understood within the Church. Thus, for example, the precept ''Thou shall not commit adultery', has traditionally been understood unequivocally to exclude not only intercourse with someone other than one's spouse (adultery), but all freely chosen genital activity outside the covenant of marriage. This was precisely the way this precept of the Decalogue was understood by the Fathers of the Church, for example, St. Augustine, by the medieval scholastics, and by all Catholic theologians until the mid 1960's. Thus, indiscussing the sixth commandment, Peter Lombard, whose Libri IV Sententiarum was used as the basic text in Catholic theology from the middle of the twelfth century until the middle of the sixteenth century, stressed that this commandment required one to forbear from all nonmarital genital activity. Lombard, together with all medieval theologians and, indeed, all Catholic theologians until the very recent past, held that any sexual activity fully contrary to the purposes of marriage and of the sexual differentiation of the species into male and female was gravely sinful as a violation of this precept of the Decalogue. This is, in addition, the teaching foind in the Roman Catechism, and the teachin of this catechism on the Precepts of the Decaloue is crucially important. The Roman Catechism, popularly known as The Catechism of the Council of Trent, was mandated by Trent, was written primarily by St. Charles Borromeo, was published with the authority of Pope St. Pius V in 1566, and was in use throughout the world until the middle of this century. It was praised by many popes, who ordered that it be put into the hands of parish priests and used in the catechetical instruction of the faithful. In 1721 Pope Clement XIII published an encyclical, In Dominico Agro, devoted to this catechism. In it he said that there was an obligation touse it throughout the universal Church as a means of 'guarding the deposit of faith.' He called it the printed form of 'that teaching which is common doctrine in the Church'. Vatican Council I said that as a result of this catechism 'the moral life of the Christian people was revitalized by the more thorough instruction given to the faithful'. From all this, one can see the significance of the witness of this catechism to truths both of faith and morals. It is a reputable witness to the ordinary, day-to-day teaching of bishops throughout the world in union with the Holy Father (...) This teaching of the Roman Catechism was in no way changed by Vatican Council II. It was, indeed, firmly reasserted. Recall that this Council, after affirming that matters of faith and morals can be taught infallibly in the day-to-day exercise of the magisterial authority by bishops throughout the world in union with the pope, insisted that this is even more the case when the bishops, assembled in an ecumenical council, act as teachers of the universal Church and as judges on matters of faith and morals. In the light of this clear teaching it is most important to examine some key statements made by the Fathers of Vatican Council II about specific moral norms. An examination of this kind shows, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the bishops united at Vatican Council II under the leadership of the pope unambiguously insisted that certain specific norms proposed by the magisterium are to be held definitively by the faithful. In doing so, they fulfilled the conditions set forth in Lumen gentium and noted already, under which bishops can propose matters of faith and/morals/infallibly. For instance, after affirming the dignity of human persons and of human life, they unequivocally brand as infamous numerous crimes against human persons and human life, declaring that: 'the varieties of crime [against human life and human persons] are numerous: all offenses against life itself, such as murder, genocide, abortion, euthanasia, and willfulself-destruction; all violations of the integrity of the human person such as mutilations, physical and mental torture, undue psychological pressures; all offenses against human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution, the selling of women and children, degrading working conditions where men are treated as mere tools for profit rather than free and responsible persons; all these and heir like are criminal; they poison civilization; and they debase their perpetrators more than their victims and militate against the honor of the Creator' (Gaudium et spes, n. 22). Some of the actions designated as criminal here are, it is true, describe in morally evaluative language, such as 'murder,' 'subhuman,' 'arbitrary' and 'degrading.' As so described, such actions are obviously immoral. But other actions unequivocally condemned as absolutely immoral in this passage are described factually, without the use of morally evaluative language, e..a., abortion, euthanasia, willful self-destruction (suicide), slavery, the selling of women and children. Specific moral norms proscribing such deeds are absolute, exceptionless" (pp. 268-271).

Esto sentado, May se ocupa del disenso del Magisterio. Para encuadrar su análisis, comienza por aclarar los orígenes del disenso: "As William B. Smith has pointed out, 'the question of Dissent as presently possed [e.g., by Curran and associateds] is of relatively recent vintage'. As Smith observes: 'A careful review of standard theological encyclopedias and dictionaries of theology finds no entries under the title of Dissent prior to 1972. Standard manuals of theology did raise possible questions about the rare individual who could not give nor offer personal assent to formal Church teaching, and such questions were discussed under treatments of the Magisterium or the Teaching of the Church, examining the status of such teaching and its binding force and/or extent' (p.274). Seguidamente nota que el Concilio Vaticano II nada nuevo estableció sobre el disenso, y en modo alguno aprobó su práctica. El único episodio que se relaciona con el tema es la respuesta que la Comisión Teológica del Concilio dio a una pregunta formulada por tres obispos, acerca del sentido del religiosum obsequium de la inteligencia y la voluntad, cuando una persona juzga que interne assentire non posset ¿Qué debe hacer entonces. "The reply of the Theological Commission was that in such instances the 'aproved theological treatises should be consulted'. As Smith observes, 'it should be noted that the question possed to the Commission concerned the negative inability to give positive assent ... which is not at all the same as a positive right to dissent'. If these 'approved theological treatises' are examined, one discovers, as Germain Grisez as shown in detail, that no approved manual of theology ever authorized dissent from authoritative magisterial teaching. Some of them treated the question of withholding internal assent by a competent person who has serious reasons for doing so. The manuals taught that such a person ought to mantain silence and communicate the difficulty he experienced in assenting teaching in question to the magisterial teacher (pope or bishops) concerned (...) They spoke, not of dissent, but of withholding assent, which is something far different from dissent" (p.275)

Se trata de un dato tan evidente, que el mismo Curran lo ha reconocido, optando por apoyar el derecho al disenso no ya en el Concilio y la alusión de la Comisión Teológica a los manuales tradicionales sino en base a lo que habría afirmado Newman en su Grammar of Assent.[24] Posición, comenta May, simplemente sorprendente, si uno recuerda lo que Newman escribía: "The sense of right and wrong, which is the first element in religion, is so delicate, so fitful, so easily puzzled, obscured, perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, so impressible by education, so biased by pride and passion, so unsteady in its course that, in the struggle for existence amid the various exercises and triumphs of the human intellect, this sense is at once the highest of all teachers, yet the least luminous; and the Church, the Pope, the hierarchy are, in divine purpose the supply of an urgent demand"[25] (pp. 276-277). En suma "the claim made by Curran and others that 'it is common teaching in Church that Catholics may dissent from authoritative noninfallible teaching of the magisterium when sufficient reasons doing so exist' is spurious supported only by weak and tendentious arguments" (p. 280). Lo ha venido a confirmar la Instrucción sobre la vocación eclesial del teólogo de 1990, distinguiendo y tratando separadamente "quaestions that theologians may raise about such teachings (nn. 24-31) and dissent from such teachings (nn. 32-41). It judges that questioning can be compatible with the 'religious submission' required, but it firmly and unequivocally repudiates dissent from these teachings as incompatible with this 'religious submission' and irreconcilable with the vocation of the theologian" (p. 280).

En suma, como el lector habrá ido comprobando a lo largo de esta nota, es la de William una Introduction to Moral Theology realmente valiosa y merecedora de ser prontamente traducida a las lenguas latinas.

R.G.H. (1991)

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[1] cfr., Ph. DELHAYE, Metaconcilio: la mancanza de in discernimento, CRIS documenti, n. 43, Roma 1980, p.17.

[2] Baste pensar en obras que fueron apareciendo desde poco después de esa fecha como las de C. CAFARRA, Viventi in Cristo (Milano 1981); G. GRISEZ, The Way of the Lord Jesus (Chicago 1983); S. PINCKAERS, Les sources de la morale chrétienne (Sa métode, son contenu, son histoire) (Fribourg 1985) y L'Evangile et la morale (Fribourg 1990); o las inmediatamente anteriores del mismo DELHAYE, Discerner le bien du mal, dans la vie morale e sociale (Etude sur la morale du Vatican II) (1979), de D.J. LALLEMENTE, La connaissance de Jesús-Christ (París 1978), Vivre en chrétienne dans notre temps (Paris 1979); y obras colectivas como Ética y teología ante la crisis contemporánea (Pamplona 1980), Principles of Catholic Moral Life (Washington 1980), Persona, verità e morale (Roma 1986), etc.

[3] Nunca se subrayara bastante este punto, si queremos ser fieles a la revelación, a nuestra incomparable dignidad de hijos de Dios por la gracia. Ciertamente, la vocación del hombre es única, de hecho sobrenatural (CONCILIO VATICANO II, Const. past. Gaudium et spes, n. 22): pero esto no comporta que la participacion en la vida divina propia de la gracia pertenezca de suyo a nuestra naturaleza, lo que negaría la existencia misma de un fin sobrenatural, reduciéndolo a una especie de "nuevo super-fin natural" del hombre histórico: cfr. G. COLOMBO, Il problema del soprannaturale negli ultimi cinquant'anni, en "Problemi e orientamenti di Teologia Dommatica", C. Marzorati Edit., Vol. II,Milano 1957, pp. 575 y ss. Son luminosas las siguientes consideraciones de otro autor contemporáneo: "Toutes les différences entre le véritable christianisme et ses déformations humaines ont là leur racine: Dieu a-t-Il voulu nous éléver à partager sa proprie vie, ou bien ses interventions par leChriste et par l'action de son Esprit ne font-elles que promouvoir la vie humaine! qu'on qualifiera de divine si elle est seulement plus humaine? On peut encore aller plus profond en dissant: la vie de Dieu, qu'est-ce que cela pour nous? Admettons-nous que Dieu a en Lui-même une vie infinie tout a fait independente de la création, et qu'ayant très librement voulu créer, Il a appelé les créatures intelligentes à une élévation par la grace au dessus de leur nature, élévation qui leur permet de communier à Sa vie divine infinie, éternelle? Ou bien, limiterons-nous notre connaissance du Dieu vivant a la connaissance d'une action divine dans le monde, dans l'humanité, qui pourrait nous porter à travailler à une sur-humanité, mais toujours seulement dans un développement indéfini de la creation' Si Dieu n'est connu de nous que dans l'espérience de notre existence humaine, de notre activite en ce monde, il n'est pas de révélation surnaturelle à proprement parler, mais un sorte de revélation immanente à la vie de l'humanité (...) Mais si Dieu a en Lui-même une vie infiniment distincte du developpement des créatures, vie proprement divine dans laquelle Il a voulu nous introduire, tout est autre. Dieu, alors, a du nous faire connaître sa vie par une révélation proprement dite. Cette révélation, l'Église nous dit qu'elle a eu deux objets, qui sont en intime connexion: ce que Dieu est en Lui-meme et son très libre dessein de nous appeler au partage de sa vie": D.J. LALLEMENT, La connaissance de Jesús-Christ, Téqui, Paris 1977, pp. 44-45.

[4] Cuestión que el autor aclara en las siguientes términos: "This analysis of the way in which Thomas incorporated Ulpian's definition of natural law into his own thought on the subject shows that he never accepted Ulpian's understanding natural law as nonrational kind of instinct. Rather, heconsistently held that natural law, formally and properly as law, is the work of practical reason.He accepted Ulpian's definition only as a very a restricted or limited way of understanding natural law, as referring those tendencies that human beings share with other animals and which, in the human animal, must be brougth under the rule of reason, under the tutelage of natural law" (p. 52).

[5] El subrayado es nuestro.

[6] Cabe aún concretar más, lo que la mayoría sostuvo no fue siquiera la licitud de la contracepción en general, sino de la "píldora contraceptiva"; nadie, en un primer momento, se atrevió a decir que podía ser lícito, por ejemplo, el onanismo: cfr., Ph. DELHAYE, Intrinsèquement déshonnête, in AA.VV. "Pour relire 'Humanae vitae'", Gembloux, 1970, pp. 23-34; R. GARCIA DE HARO, Matrimonio e famiglia nei Documenti del Magistero, Ares, Milano 1989, pp. 175-176 y 213 y ss; The Formation of the Priest in Pastoral Assistance to the Family, Vatican Polyglot Press, Roma 1991, pp. 21-25.

[7] Basan esta argumentación en la no condena por el Magisterio de la pena de muerte: no vamos a entrar aquí en la discusión pendiente sobre el tema; nos limitaremos a subrayar que entre la muerte del inocente (siempre condenada por la Iglesia) y la muerte de un criminal hay un cambio del objeto moral del acto; y que nunca la Iglesia ha admitido que pueda existir razón proporcionada para matar un inocente.

[8] Fuchs, Christian Ethics in a Secular Arena, p. 72.

[9] Janssens, "Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethic", 208.

[10] Fuchs, Christian Ethics in a Secular Arena, p. 72; see Fuchs "Naturrecht oder naturalisticher Fehlschluss?" 411,416,419; see also Richard McCormick, Notes on Moral Theology 1965-1980 (Lanham,MD: University Press of America, 1981), pp. 578-579.

[11] Fuchs, Personal Responsability and Christian Morality, p. 191; Fuchs, Christian Ethics in a Secular Arena, p. 74; Janssens, "Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethic", 210,216; Gula, Reason Informed by Faith, p. 288-289.

[12] Gula, Reason Informed by Faith, p. 291.

[13] Gula, Reason Informed by Faith, p. 291.

[14] Francis Sullivan, Magisterium: Teaching Authority in the Catholic Church (New York: Paulist Press, 1983), pp. 150-151. Sullivan lists Curran, Fuchs, Bockle, Shuller, Haring, and other revisionists as agreeing with this way of putting the matter.

[15] Fuchs, Personal Responsability and Christian Morality, 129.

[16] Ibid., p. 124.

[17] Sullivan, Magisterium, pp.l51-152; see Fuchs, Personal Responsability and Christian Morality, p. 140.

[18] Gaudium et spes, n29; Lumen gentium, n 19.

[19] Lumen gentium, n. 13.

[20] Gaudium et spes, n. 29; Lumen gentium, n. 13.

[21] En apéndice trata la discusión sobre el pensamiento de Santo Tomás acerca de los absolutos morales, que los revisionistas han interpretado equivocadamente, para concluir: "This thought can be summarized as follows: 1. He teaches that there are acts that are 'evil in themselves in their kind' (secundum se malas ex genere), which may never be done 'for any good' (pro nulla utilitate), 'in no way' (nullo modo), 'in no event' (in nullo casu) —and gives examples of such acts in morally neutral terms: killing the innocent (Summa Theologiae, 2-2, 64, 6), committing adultery in order to overthrow tyranny (De Malo, q. 15, a.1, ad. 5), 'putting forth falsehood' (Summa theologiae, 2-2, 69,2). 2. He teaches that besides affirmative precepts (which bind generally, semper, but not universally, ad semper), there are negative precepts whicw are valid and binding always and universally (semper et ad semper), e.g, 'at no time is one to steal or commit adultery' (Ad Romanos, c. 13, lect.2; In III Sent. d.25, q.2, a.1b, ad 3; In IV Sent d. 17, q.3, a. 1d, ad 3; De Malo, q. 7, a.1, ad. 8; Summa theologiae, 2-2, 33; 79, 3, ad 3). He everywhere rejects arguments attempting to solve 'conflict' cases by identifying a state of affairs or effect which could to seem to be lesser evil (minus malum) than doing act that is wicked in itself of its kind (secundum se malum ex genere) (In IV Sent. d 6, q. 1, qua 1, a. 1, ad. 4; Summa theologiae, 2-2, 110, 3, ad 4; 3, 68, 11, ad 3; 80, 6, ad 2). 4. He teaches that it is a revealed truth that evil may not be done for the sake of good, even the highest and greatest good such as salvation (Summa theologiae, 3, 68, 11, ad 3). 5. He teaches, as we have seen, that the precepts of the Decalogue, most of wich are negative and binding always and universally (semper et ad semper) are, when properly understood, subject to no exceptions whatsoever, even by divine dispensation (Summa theologiae, 1-2, 100, 8, In III Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 4). The conclusion is evident: St. Thomas affirmed the truth of moral absolutes" (pp. 165-166).

[22] Entre ellas, además de las cuatro cardinales, incluida por tanto la prudencia, esa otra virtud —tan central en la Biblia, particularmente en el Nuevo Testamento— que es la humildad.

[23] De quien cita (pp. 272-273) el siguiente inequívoco pasaje: "The Church teaches these commandments [the Ten Commandments] with divine authority exactly as she teaches the other 'truths of thefaith', either through her 'ordinary' magisterium or through an act of her 'extraordinary' magisterium in ex cathedra definitions of the Pope or a general council, but also through her ordinary magisterium, that is, in the normal teaching of the faith to the faithful in schools, sermons, and all the other kinds of instruction. In the nature of the case this will be the normal way in which moral norms are taught, and definitions by Pope or general council the exception; but it is binding on the faithful in conscience just as the teaching through the extraordinary magisterium is.... It is the-refore quite untrue that only those moral norms for which there is a solemn definition...are binding in the faith on the Christian as revealed by God... When the whole Church in her everyday teaching does in fact teach a moral rule everywhere in the world as a commandment of God, she is preserved from error by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, and this rule is therefore really the will of God and is binding on the faithful in conscience: Karl Rahner, S.J., Nature and grace: Dilemmas in the Modern Church (London: Sheed & Ward, 1963) pp. 51-52.

[24] Curran et al., Dissent in and for Church, pp. 47-48.

[25] J.H. NEWMAN, "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, en "Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching", vol II, Christians Classics, Westminster 1969, p. 240.