BOURGEOIS, Armand LE
Chrétiens divorcés remariés
Desclée de Brouwer, Paris 1990, 191 pp.
I. DOCTRINAL ASSESSMENT
A criticism of "l'attitude juridique de
Rome" with regard to the "right" of divorced remarried persons
to be admitted to the Eucharist; and an effort to justify the "dépassements
pastoraux qui se cherchent en France... du côté discutable de l'ancien canon
1012, 2, etc." (107).
There is practically no theological argumentation in the book; it simply seeks
to draw pastoral and emotional support essentially from letters written by
"divorcés remariés".
The first part —personal
"testimonies"— is fairly effective, from the emotional viewpoint; the
second part, with views of non-Catholics, is much weaker.
He professes to accept indissolubility, and
makes no theological arguments against it. His plea is simply that certain
pastoral exceptions should be allowed; and he appeals particularly to the
practice of the Orthodox Church.
In fact his plea is not that the new situation
of the "divorcés remariés" be considered as a valid
"marriage" (cf. his insistence that the "remarriage" of
divorcés must avoid any sort of religious celebration that would suggest that
it is considered a sacrament: 187), but simply that, as long as their
cohabitation has a certain solidity to it and is backed by a desire for a
christian life, they should be admitted to the Eucharist.
He avoids defending "remarriage". But
when one of his correspondants asks, "le remarriage est-il une faute
impardonnable?" (19), he does not ask in reply, "is remarriage
possible?" His position, therefore, must appear to many to imply such a
defence of "remarriage"; and then it can be logically taken as a
basis for a claim to admission to the Eucharist of those living in
non-formalised illegitimate unions ("compagnonnage"). Some of his correspondents
have no difficulty in proposing or living this (28-29; 32; 94-95); yet he makes
no comment.
Sketchy exposé of Catholic teaching on marriage
after divorce (115ss): giving a few scattered references to magisterial
documents, he seems to suggest (more than to affirm) that the Church's attitude
on this matter has undergone change (119-123).
He argues, with very peculiar logic, that the
divorce may have been a sin, and so may have been the remarriage; but that to continue
subsequently to live as husband and wife cannot conceivably be sinful
(180-181)!
There are quite a few references to marriage being
a sign of the covenant; and he himself even asks: "Pourquoi un deuxième
mariage après divorce qui se vit dans la Foi et l'amour ne pourrait-il pas être
signe" (90). He
makes no mention of the fact that christian marriage is precisely the sign of
Christ's unbreakable love.
He leaves without answer the complaint of one
person: "«On ne sépare pas ce que Dieu a uni». Mais d'où vient exactement
cette Parole. De Dieu,
du Fils de Dieu ou de l'Eglise?" 16. The ignorance of his correspondents
on this point is most striking (cf 30-31); one would expect him to comment on
the appalling level of religious instruction that it shows.
The suggestion is repeated by different writers
that the difficulties are all the result of the laws of men, not that of God:
22; 35; 65. When he ventures an explanation, he makes no reference to Mt 19,
1-12, but leaves the impression that what one has to deal with is in fact
simply an ecclesiastical principle (35). He speaks often of "amertume
contre l'Eglise" (7; cf. 26), but says not a word to point out that what
is at stake is a law of God, not just of the Church; he rather allows the
contrary impression (20; 24; 26; 83). He implies (90 in medio), and allows
other to believe, that it is (only) because a marriage is celebrated religiously
that it is indissoluble.
He does not give the obvious answers to some
elementary errors. For
instance: "Une seconde union n'a-t-elle pas le droit de prétendre à
témoigner de «l'union du Christ et de l'Eglise» parce qu'elle a été précédée
d'une première qui n'y a pas réussi?'' (57). "N'y a-t-il pas des péchés
aussi graves [as living in adultery], et peut-être plus, qui ne sont pas
obstacle à la réception des sacrements?" (89). "si... au lieu de
divorcer j'avais eu une maîtresse tout serait dans l'ordre etabli"
(69). He himself tends
to subscribe to this latter charge (92, n. 6). Throughout he allows, without
correcting, the fundamental misunderstanding: "seuls les divorcés remariés
n'ont droit à aucune clémence" (84).
He makes only a brief reference to the decision
of the separated or divorced person to remain faithful to the indissolubility
of the marriage bond, and does not comment on the personal and ecclesial value
that this testimony has; the possibility merited more than the two paragraphs
he devotes to it (164). Throughout he rather speaks of remarriage as the only
practical outlet for the person whose marriage has broken down.
His plea (40-49) that non-baptized who want
baptism, but are married to a divorced Catholic, should not be 'penalised`;
i.e. should be allowed a sort of pauline privilege.
Re the Church's concern that the
divorced-remarried, even tohough they cannot receive the Eucharist, should take
part in worship (cf. quote from Familiaris Consortio on p. 165): he allows,
without comment, some of his correspondents to present this pastoral concern or
concession as an unreasonable imposition: the Church is calling on us to
live a Christian life, while at the same time refusing to us the means
necessary to do so: cf. p. 140 in fine; 30-31; 35; 89, etc.
The one time he gives an opposite viewpoint (in
favour of firmness on the Church's part), it is very partially and poorly expressed
(74-76). He could have added other arguments to ilustrate the positive reasons
for the Church's position.
He gives a partial, and inexact, notion of the
"Petrine privilege" (116).
Curiously, he fails to mention exclusion of
indissolubility and fidelity as motives of nullity (166).
II. PASTORAL OPPORTUNENESS
He quotes correspondants who speak of the new
hope he has given them. He seems proud of this; and unaware of the bewilderment
his publications and TV interviews must have caused among the ordinary run of
the faithful.
One of the most worrying things pastorally is
the undercurrent of self-justification present in many of his correspondents,
which he seems unaware of or unconcerned with. They write not as persons who
are sorry for what they have done, but as those who feel victimised and
penalised for having done something which is natural, justifiable and not wrong
(69; 95; 103-104, etc.).
He seems unaware of a certain naïve arrogance
characterizing many of these letters. The argument in effect is: there is
something sacred about love [even adulterous love!], so why does the Church not
bless it? (cf. 56; 109-110):
"Pour ceux qui ont la grâce de vivre un nouvel amour, pourquoi le
sacrement de mariage n'est-il pas aussi renouvelé?". There seems to be no awareness that
they have offended God by breaking his law; on the contrary there is a fairly
common attitude of personal virtue: "je suis honnête, je l'ai toujours
été" (69; cf. 109). If there is some sense of a past fault, there is a
facile assumption that God has forgiven it, even though they are determined to
remain in the same irregular situation. cf. "quand Dieu accorde son pardon ..., pourquoi
l'Eglise hésiterait-elle tant à le manifester?" (57).
He accepts the repeated viewpoint that the
action of getting divorced [and remarrying] was blameless ("ce divorce
dont il n'est résulté aucun mal" 23), without any comment, even on such
obvious human points as the weakening example to those who are tempted to
abandon a difficult marriage situation. He fails to use the opportunities
offered when a correspondent mentions the divorced remarried as having a sense
of "fault" (which they imply is self-induced, or socially induced,
but does not correspond to anything real); e.g. the divorcé-remarié "est
prisonnier de lui même (d'une faute qu'il croit sans rémission)"
(61). He fails to suggest that the sense of fault may correspond to wrong
really done, and that, as in the case of other sins, forgiveness for it is
always available if a person is prepared to do all they can to set the wrong
right.
His correspondants are almost all filled with
great selfpity. As regards their divorce they feel they have been
"victimes d'un échec" (cf. 59; 63; 65). They seem to feel that
because they have a desire for the Eucharist (on their own terms), they have a right
to it. He nowhere takes advantage of their desire to suggest that they consider
putting their irregular situation in order; he fails to point out that their
situation makes them unworthy of receiving the Sacrament; nor does he remind
them that the Church has the duty to protect the Eucharist from unworthy
reception; and that it is not the Church, but their persistence in an
adulterous situation that is the block to their communicating.
The book presents frequent cases of people who
apparently were not to blame in a divorce situation (abandoned by other
spouse), but whom he presents as not to blame for a subsequent remarriage
(42, n. 3;). He fails to point out that while they committed no fault in the
divorce, they committed a most clear fault in the remarriage.
The cases he presents are habitually of persons
who want to put some interest before the marriage bond; e.g. a lady, civilly
married to a non-practicing Catholic, who wants to be baptized. But, since she
is not sure about the success of their marriage, she resists the idea of
regularising their situation by a religious ceremony soon after baptism. In
other words, she wants to have licence to live on a "trial" basis
with this man, and later make up her mind (46-48).
His stance is that the marriage bond ought
to yield to some immediate personal interest: the desire of a non-baptized, who
lives in concubinage with a divorced Catholic, to be baptized (42-44); he gives
the reader the impression that the Church absolutely refuses to baptize such a
person. This of course is not true; there is no obstacle to her receiving
baptism; but she must then respect the existing bond. It is extraordinary to
find him writing: "C'est vraiment un paradoxe insupportable. Comment le baptême pourrait-il introduire
dans en état de péché!" (45).
Many of his correspondants testify to having
been active Catholics —"militants"— in parishes which they consider
to have had a very strong Catholic life. One is tempted to think that they were
'avant-garde' parishes, characterized by dissent and by a grave lack of any
true catechetical formation.
He himself writes: "Je remarque aussi que des
couples de divorcés ont souvent un rôle très actif dans la communauté locale
dont its font partie". This comment can only be designed to give deliberate support to priests
who countenance such an unnecessary and potentially scandalous state of
affairs, as well as encouragement to others to adopt the same policy. He quotes
one priest as to the encouragement other priests receive from his stance (102).
The action of those priests who encourage
people in this situation to participate in the Eucharist is presented as
"courageux" (24); he quotes without comment the "sainte
audace" of priests who admit divorced-remarried to the sacraments (60).
On some occasions he pleads that since he is
not bishop of the diocese of the person concerned, he cannot
"authorise" their receiving the Eucharist (e.g. 49-51). On other
occasions, however, he does so "authorise" them. In one case at
least, one gets the impression that he advised a man with some scruples, to
receive Communion without going to Confession, or without mentioning in
Confession his concrete position (106).
C.B. (1990)
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